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FRANCHISING IN CHINA
"Two men look out through the same bars:
One sees the mud, and one the stars."
- Frederick Langbridge'
INTRODUCTION
The complicated and often inconsistent legal "bars" that face
franchisors in China have not distracted these international investors
from the glowing dollar signs.2 While there are only about 1,000
franchisees in China operating approximately 100,000 outlets, they
generate over eighty-five billion dollars in annual sales.3 The China
Chainstore and Franchise Association predicts that franchising will
comprise over thirty percent of retail sales by 2010.4
With China's population gaining in affluence and maintaining a
stronger middle-class base, U.S.-based franchises in China have
found a receptive market.' In the past few years, the franchise
business model has grown from non-existent to an attractive business
1. The Quotations Page, Quotations by Author: Frederick Langbridge (1849-
1923), at http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/FrederickLangbridge/ (last
visited Feb. 29, 2004).
2. See Steaming, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2003 (citing an estimate by the Bank
Credit Analyst, a Canadian research firm, that China accounted for twenty-five
percent of global growth in 1995-2003),
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfim?story-id=2216039 (last visited Feb.
14, 2004). The rate of imports in China has risen forty percent in the past twelve
months, while U.S. imports grew by only two percent. Id.
3. See Franchising Becomes Popular, SHANGHAI DAILY, Sep. 4, 2003
(detailing findings by the China Chainstore and Franchise Association, the largest
trade organization in China, which compiles data on the retail and franchising
industries), 2003 WL 62361045.
4. See id. (attributing the increasing popularity of the franchising format to the
perception that franchises are "less risky, inexpensive and lucrative").
5. See National Bureau of Statistics, People's Republic of China, Statistical
Communique 2002 (Feb. 28, 2003) (stating that the annual per capita disposable
income of urban households in China has increased 13.4% this past year),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newrelease/statisticalreports/t20030312_70606.ht
m (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). With price factors taken into consideration, total
retail sales of consumer goods increased 10.2% in the past year. Id; see also
Franchising Becomes Popular, supra note 3 (implying that because the United
States is the world's most developed country in the franchising business, expansion
into China was inevitable). Several U.S. franchisors have already established stores
in China, including KFC, Subway, Starbucks, and Athlete's Foot. Id.
2004]
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option; yet, even with the recent growth in popularity of the franchise
format, the potential for future growth in China is tremendous.6 With
U.S.-brand recognition currently at its peak, well-established
franchisors seeking a less saturated market than the United States
will find promising opportunities in the Chinese market.7
While the potential profit margin is enough for anyone to go East
in search of striking gold, several problems bar the path to easy
profits.8 China's accession into the World Trade Organization
("WTO") has done much to alleviate fears of foreign enterprise
investors, with U.S. franchisors looking forward to greater market
access through the relaxing of geographic restrictions, national
treatment for foreign invested enterprises ("FEI"), and stricter
intellectual property regulations.' Despite the promised
improvements, franchisors should be wary of the lax licensing
6. See Franchising Becomes Popular, supra note 3 (quoting Global Sources, a
trade publisher, as stating that while franchise sales in developed countries account
for over forty percent of total retail sales, franchise sales in China only account for
two percent); see also China Country Commercial Guide (contending that there is
still room for franchise development in numerous profitable markets),
http://www.mac.doc.gov/Tcc/DATA/commercehtml/countries/Countries/China/C
ountryCommercial/2000/body.html#1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
7. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Tops International Brands in China, PEOPLE'S
DAILY, June 26, 2000 (citing an A.C. Nielson Co. survey which found that "as
many as 45 percent of those surveyed [in China] said they had tasted Kentucky
fried chicken at least once."), available at
http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200006/26/eng20000626_43930.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003).
8. See Kentucky Fried Chicken China Earns U.S. $250 MLN Per Year Since
1999, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 29, 2001 (citing J. Samuel Su, president of Tricon China,
a subsidiary of the U.S. based fast food corporation Tricon Global Restaurants, as
stating that over ninety-nine percent of KFC stores in China have made a
"handsome" profit),
http://www.siamfuture.com/asiannews/asiannewstxt.asp?aid= 1981 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2004). Since 1999, KFC's Chinese operations have garnered over $250
million dollars each year. Id.
9. See generally Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China,
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (outlining the steps that China needed to take to accede
to the WTO, including the development of transparency in laws and regulations
relating to any foreign exchange, and the repeal of all laws inconsistent with WTO
policies of national treatment),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc (last visited Feb. 15,
2004).
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regulations, vague laws, and weak intellectual property protection
that could undermine the very identity of a franchise. 10
This comment traces the development of franchise law in China
and evaluates whether the evolution of the laws affecting foreign
franchises in this country effectively provides protection for
franchisors." While there have been changes in both the rule of law
and the laws themselves, this comment argues that the development
in the laws are still not sufficient to provide adequate protection for
franchises. 12  Because of this insufficient protection, foreign
franchisors should take the additional protection of maintaining as
much control over a franchise system as possible in its business
ownership, intellectual property, and contractual agreements. 3 Part I
examines the different franchise structures in China and provides an
overview of current regulations affecting franchises. 4 Part II
analyzes gaps in legal protection created by vague and inconsistent
laws, a thin rule of law, and limited resources for legal enforcement
in the Chinese legal system. 5 Part III provides recommendations for
10. See Franchising Becomes Popular, supra note 3 (noting that Sha Yiwen,
director of the Shanghai Trade Exhibition Office, has warned that China's lack of a
legal framework for licensing and general ignorance of the franchise business
structure are factors that could prove detrimental to the future of franchising in
China).
11. See infra Part II.B (describing how the Chinese legal system's problems
with corruption and the government's inability to enforce laws designed to prevent
this corruption can pose significant hurdles for investors entering the Chinese
market).
12. See infra Part II.B (analyzing how the legal framework in China has only
created a thin rule of law that cannot support the rapidly growing international
marketplace).
13. See infra Parts ILA, II.C (analyzing the pros and cons of each franchise
structure and the laws that govern each structure, and concluding that steps must be
taken to maintain as much control as possible over the franchise system).
14. See infra Part I (discussing different types of franchise structures that initial
franchise outlets can take when first entering the Chinese market, the structure that
the franchise system can take, and the intellectual property, contract, dispute
resolution, and foreign investment laws that affect these businesses).
15. See infra Part II (presenting issues businesses should consider in
developing enterprises and analyzing how these decisions relate to the problems in
China's legal system and the problems with the laws themselves).
9532004]
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how franchisors can avoid legal pitfalls and take the necessary steps
to franchise successfully in China. 16
I. BACKGROUND
Since the start of communism, China has maintained its isolation
and done little to interact with other countries. 7 Partly as a result of
this isolationist policy, the country declined in prosperity as it relied
on a strictly controlled market that hinged on unsuccessful and
corrupt state owned enterprises ("SOEs"). s China's history includes
many unsuccessful government attempts to independently modernize
China's economy.'9 Success in creating change arrived in 1978,
when the Communist Party focused on economic development.20
Despite the government's focus on market development, China has
continued its commitment to political socialism. 2' The unique
16. See infra Part III (arguing that despite the problems with the Chinese legal
system, the potential for growth is enormous, and that waiting to enter the Chinese
market might place franchisors at a disadvantage later on).
17. See DANIEL C. K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES
AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 15-29 (2002) (describing
China's history and the interaction between the political and economic roles of the
government).
18. See id. (characterizing the time period of 1949-78 as defined by strong
government market control where the State created and managed businesses that
provided employment for the people).
19. See id. at 15-26 (tracing the history of China's failed attempts to modernize
the economy). The Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962 was one of the earliest
failed attempts to modernize through encouraging the masses to increase crop
productivity. Id. at 16. This attempt to modernize resulted in a disastrous famine
that killed between twenty-five and thirty million people. Id. at 16. Another
attempt, known as the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, denounced
bourgeoisie ideals and emphasized the importance of the masses. Id. Professionals
and those attending universities were sent out into the rural areas of China to learn
from the farmers. Id. This revolution created China's ten year economic standstill.
Id. at 16-17.
20. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 20 (discussing the revitalization of the
economy through a focus on a "socialist market economy"). China has allowed for
more market freedom in the private sector, but the market is still subject to the
constraints of the state sector's goals. Id. This is demonstrated by China's
continued ownership of all real property and means of production. Id.
21. See Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the
Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 497
(2003) (concluding that the Chinese legal system "is explicitly meant to function as
[19:949
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atmosphere of a market oriented government in a strictly controlled
political environment has forced foreign businesses to carefully
adjust their business models to "fit" China's political objectives and
policies.22
A. FRANCHISING DEFINED
The franchise structure originated in the United States,23 and has
since spread throughout the world.24 A franchise exists when a
franchisor grants to a franchisee the right to market goods and
services following established marketing and distribution practices
with the assistance of the franchisor. In a franchise relationship, the
a 'tool of the state"' (quoting Suzanne Ogden, CHINA'S UNRESOLVED ISSUES:
POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURE, 188 (1989)); see also Peter Koveos,
Economies in Transition: Recent Performance, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM.
287, 290-91 (2003) (asserting that political socialism in China has also been called
"market socialism," to describe the co-existence of a market economy and
government controlled by a single party).
22. See Frank Horwitz, There is an Art to Doing Business in China, BUSINESS
DAY (South Africa), Feb. 24, 2003, at 1 (identifying the need for an understanding
of the Chinese culture as a key factor to success when doing business in China),
2003 WL 6967254; see also Starbucks Brews Storm in China's Forbidden City,
Dec. 11, 2000 (describing the outrage that Starbucks encountered when Meida
Coffee Co., the Starbucks franchise for Northern China, first introduced a store in
the Forbidden City), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/FOOD/news/12/11 /china.starbucks.reut/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2004). The Chinese media lambasted Starbucks for "slapping China's 1.2
billion people and 5,000-year traditional culture in the face." Id.
23. See DAVID J. KAUFMANN, UNDERSTANDING FRANCHISING, BUSINESS &
LEGAL ISSUES 13 (2001) (tracing the origin of franchise law to the 1850s, when the
Singer Company set up a franchise network to sell sewing machines). Franchising,
however, did not become widespread until the 1950s and 1960s, when currently
popular chains like McDonald's, Burger King, and Kentucky Fried Chicken first
opened. Id.
24. See Richard C. Hoffman & John F. Preble, Franchising into the Twenty-
First Century, BUSINESS HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1999, 35, 39 (1993) (citing the
International Franchise Association as having determined that more than eighty-
three percent of U.S. franchisor's outlets are located in Canada, Japan, Europe,
Australia, and the United Kingdom).
25. See KAUFMANN, supra note 23, at 16-17 (defining the franchise
relationship). Franchisors provide franchisees with information, techniques, and
advice on how to operate a franchise outlet, and grant licenses to use the
franchisor's intellectual property marks. Id. at 16. Franchisors may also grant
franchisees the right to develop stores in a particular geographic region. Id.
2004] 955
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franchisor grants franchise identity rights to franchisees, either
directly or indirectly.26 Depending on their needs, parties to a
franchise agreement can adopt different types of franchise
structures.27
1. Franchising - A New Concept in China
There is no Chinese word for "franchise, ' 28 and for many years,
franchising as it exists in the United States did not exist in China.29
However, the Chinese government has begun to recognize the
viability of franchising and chain stores as a business structure.3"
From the time that China opened its doors to foreign investment, the
Franchisees must pay for the limited license to use the franchise name and to
obtain information to create the franchise outlet stores, and are obligated to
continue paying royalty fees for these rights. Id. at 17.
26. See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING (Richard
M. Asbill & Steven M. Goldman eds., 2001) (discussing franchising in several
areas of law, including contracts, intellectual property, taxation, and dispute
resolution).
27. See Andrew A. Coffey et al., Structuring the Franchise Relationship, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 26, at 41, 41-75
(explaining in depth the different types of franchising structures).
28. See Wilke English & Chin Xau, Franchising in China: A 1994 Look at
KFC and McDonald's in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING IN EMERGING MARKETS:
CHINA, INDIA, AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 37, 43 (Ilan Alon & Dianne H.B.
Welsh, eds. 2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING IN EMERGING
MARKETS] (noting that there is no exact translation for franchise and that the
closest is the term "chain store").
29. See id. at 37 (explaining how because the franchise business format did not
exist in China, McDonald's and KFC started out as joint ventures in partnership
with the Chinese government).
30. See China to Unveil New Rules for Franchisers, CHINA DAILY, July 8,
2002 (demonstrating that the Chinese government has recognized the franchising
business format through its decision to implement new regulations governing
franchises in the near future),
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/ShowText?infoid=36373&p-qry=franchise
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004); see also Asia's First Institute of Franchising Set up in
China, PEOPLE'S DAILY, June 6, 2003 (describing how the severe shortage of
management talent spurred Beijing Normal University to set up the first institute of
franchising in China's Guangdong province),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200306/06/eng20030606_117778.shtml (last
visited Feb. 15, 2004).
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country has been cautious in structuring its rules which govern
foreign enterprises.3
While the November 1997 Measures for Administration of
Commercial Franchise Operations promulgated by China's Ministry
of Internal Trade Regulations, seem applicable only to China's
domestic chain operations, the government has applied them to
foreign operations.32 Article 5 of these measures recognizes two
types of franchise structures: a direct franchise or a franchise that
allows master franchisees to distribute the franchise out to sub-
franchisees.33
2. Direct Franchising
In direct franchising, the franchisor directly grants the right to
operate individual or multiple franchise units in a particular location
or area.34 Direct franchising has proved to be a successful option for
several foreign companies, including Kodak, which created a
partnership with the Bank of China to provide financial aid for those
seeking to open stores.35 Under this structure, franchisors can directly
31. See Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law Implementing Rules, part 1,
art. 5, translated in CHOW, supra note 17, App. I.F at 304-05 [hereinafter WFOE
Rules] (listing reasons why applications for establishing a Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprise would not be approved, which include harm to the public interest, state
security, and sovereignty, or where the requirements of China's national economic
development would not be met).
32. See Anna M. Han, Legal Aspects of Franchising in China, in
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 28, at 83, 85
(stating that while the measures are not expressly applicable to foreign industries
because the measures are promulgated by the Ministry of Internal Trade, foreign
franchisors should follow these regulations).
33. See id. at 85 (translating the Measures for the Administration of
Commercial Franchise Operations as recognizing the direct franchising and sub-
franchising formats).
34. See Catherine A. Riesterer, Structuring the Contractual Relationship, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 26, at 37, 41-44
(noting that with both direct and area franchising, the ability to purchase additional
franchise units can be a strong incentive in franchise systenis).
35. See Kodak Aims to Take Lion Share of Chinese Digital Printing Market,
CHINA DAILY, May 27, 2003 (charting the rapid development of the digital photo
industry in China, and noting that the partnership between the Bank of China and
Kodak aids Chinese investors who do not have adequate funds to purchase the
expensive digital printing equipment), http://
9572004]
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franchise from the business' country of origin or from a branch
office in China. 6 Where a foreign entity completely owns a franchise
system or an individual franchise outlet, China's laws on wholly
foreign-owned enterprises ("WFOEs") regulate such a relationship.
a. The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
In the past, China has limited or banned completely the ability of
foreign investors to operate WFOEs in certain industries.37 However,
China's entrance into the WTO led to the Amendments to the
Implementation Rules of the Law on WFOEs. 8 Despite the changes,
China attempts to retain control of the market by strongly
encouraging the development of enterprises that are "beneficial to
the development of China's national economy" and by maintaining
absolute prohibitions over certain industries.3 9
b. Development and Master Franchising Agreements
Franchisors can also introduce their franchise into China by
working with a Chinese business.40 With development agreements,
www 1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-05/27/content_166648.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2004).
36. See Alexander S. Konigsberg, Practical Problems and Suggested Solutions
Associated with International Franchising, 7-SPG FRANCHISE L. J. 3, 3 (1988)
(describing the different types of franchising structures and arguing that a
franchisor should carefully examine the benefits and problems associated with
each structure to avoid costly mistakes).
37. See Michael E. Burke, IV et al., China Law, 36 INT'L LAW. 815, 822 (2002)
(noting that with the Amendments, WFOEs were "no longer required to adopt
advanced technology or be export-oriented"). The Decision on Amendments also
eliminated quotas for market sales and preferential treatment for domestic
suppliers. Id.; see also WFOE Rules, supra note 31, part 1, art. 5 (stating that the
Chinese government still retains the right to not approve a wholly owned enterprise
if the enterprise would harm China's public interest).
38. See Burke, supra note 37, at 821 (determining that commitments made
under the WTO accession led to the amendments in JV and WFOE laws).
39. See WFOE Rules, supra note 31, art. 3 (encouraging advanced technology,
development of new products, and saving energy).
40. See UNIDROIT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENTS 4
(1998) (explaining how franchisors who work with companies from the country in
which they want to franchise have the advantages of investing less money to
958 [19:949
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franchisors can grant all development and ownership rights to a
company to open franchise outlets in China.4" Franchisors can also
grant master franchise agreements, which allow franchisees in China
to develop and operate franchise stores and gives master franchisees
the right to grant franchise rights to sub-franchisees.42 Another option
of franchising is the creation of a joint venture, where a franchisor
forms a company with a Chinese business, and this newly formed
company creates franchise agreements for direct store ownership or
sub-franchising rights.43 Where a Chinese company and a foreign
company join to develop a third, separate, business, China's Joint
Venture ("V") laws govern this third entity. 44
B. JOINT VENTURE STRUCTURES
The JV was the primary investment option in the 1980s in China
because it allowed foreign enterprises to have a local Chinese partner
who was familiar with the province where the business was located.45
Because JVs were designed to be temporary business structures,
approval of a JV's creation is often contingent on the establishment
of a set term of years in which the JV will exist.4 6 JVs fall into two
increase the size of the franchise network, and of understanding the local customs
and conditions).
41. See Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 3 (clarifying that this type of franchising
model allows a company to have direct control over all franchise stores, which
further allows the implementation of changes in the franchise system to occur more
quickly).
42. See Han, supra note 32, at 84 (stating that this type of agreement allows for
rapid expansion). But see Riesterer, supra note 34, at 37, 50-51 (warning that
problems might arise because master franchise agreements generally state that
when the franchisee is terminated, these rights are automatically assigned to the
sub-franchisee).
43. See Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 4 (stating that international franchisors
typically do this when the franchisor does not have sufficient financial and human
resources to successfully manage a franchise system in the foreign country).
44. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 40 (clarifying that the joint venture is a legal
entity separate from the companies that formed it).
45. See id. at 41 (stating that the benefits of a local partner include the ability to
navigate local bureaucracy and useful local business connections).
46. See WILLIAM B. GAMBLE, INVESTING IN CHINA: LEGAL, FINANCIAL AND
REGULATORY RISK 156 (2002) (noting that while JVs are usually temporary
arrangements, indefinite terms are available but not in service industries and land
development projects).
2004] 959
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categories: the equity joint venture ("EN") and the contractual joint
venture ("CN").4 7 The CJV is a company operating under a contract
between two parties, 48 while the EN is more structured by Chinese
law.49 In the past, foreign investors have predominantly used the
ENV. 50
Despite the prevalence of U.S.-based businesses in China, the
basic franchising structure, whereby franchise rights are directly
granted from the franchisor to the franchisee, has been rare.5 1 Some
U.S.-based companies have followed the traditional unit, area, and
master franchising formats while doing business in China. 2 Other
corporations have opted to enter the market by maintaining direct
ownership and control over stores as WFOEs or through JV
47. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 41-43 (comparing EJVs and CJVs to
determine differences and similarities).
48. See id. at 41-42 (determining that CJVs are more flexible because they
allow foreign investors to create contracts in which they recover their investments
first, and the company does not need to have the status of a legal person); see also
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures, ch. 4
(1995) (detailing investment and cooperation conditions), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200301/20030100062857_1.xml (last visited
Feb. 12, 2004). Once parties invest cash or other property rights in a cooperative
JV, the property is owned by both parties in a cooperative JV. Id. art. 19. If a party
fails to make the promised investment set out in the contract or to follow the
conditions of the contract, then that party is liable. Id. art. 21.
49. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Law on
Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, art. 4 (1979) (defining the EJV as a limited
liability company where the foreign partner's capital cannot, in general, be less
than twenty-five percent), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200301
/20030100062855_1.xml (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). EJVs share profits and losses
in proportion to the contribution of registered capital, and the partnership cannot be
dissolved unless all parties approve. Id.
50. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 41 (stating that there has long been the
impression that EJVs provide more stability under the law, but that CJVs actually
have more flexibility).
51. See Dai Yan, International Chain of Firms to Expand, CHINA DAILY, July
8, 2002 (stating that all McDonald's outlets in China were directly-run chains, and
that McDonald's would only be willing to begin franchising after the Chinese
government defined relevant regulations and laws),
http://www 1 .chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-07/08/content_ I26895.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004).
52. See id. (discussing how KFC's first franchisee opened in 1993 in Xi'an).
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development agreements. 3 Regardless of which investment vehicle
investors select, franchisors must obtain approval from the Chinese
government before any stores can open.5 4
Even with Chinese laws specifying the different types of
investment vehicles, foreign investors have a difficult time
deciphering which regulations to follow in foreign investment.55
Foreign investors have long found difficulty in navigating the
complex, and often contradictory, rules and regulations governing
foreign investment in China.56
C. CHINA'S FRAMEWORK OF LAWS
In 1978, China lacked contract laws, corporate laws, intellectual
property laws, security laws, and banking laws. 7 Since then,
dramatic changes in the law and legal structure have occurred. 8
Since 1978, the government passed more than 350 laws and 6,000
53. See id. (discussing how McDonald's owns and operates all of its outlets).
54. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 54 (explaining how the examining committee
that governs the particular industry that the JV is involved in must approve the JV).
The State Development Planning Commission approves project proposals and the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation approves JV contracts at the
national level, while the provincial planning commissions approve projects at the
local level. Id.
55. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF
LAW 463 (2002) (describing the frustration of investors who were subject to laws
and internal administrative regulations to which they did not have access).
56. See Kui HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW 44-46 (2000) (describing
some criticisms of the Chinese legal system that provided the basis for foreigners'
confusion). Critics argue that the law is a political tool in China; the laws and
policies change too frequently, courts infrequently enforce judgments, the lack of
stare decisis prevents adequate interpretation of laws, and that widespread
corruption is a strong indicator of rampant disrespect for the laws. Id.
57. See id. at 11 (stating that from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, several
serious political movements interrupted the drafting of new legislation in China,
eventually destroying the legal foundations created by the 1954 Constitution).
58. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Law Digest
(translating the text of recently enacted legislation, including the Contract Law,
Secured Interest Law, Copyright Law, and Regulations on Joint Ventures),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/lawdigest.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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regulations.5 9 Despite the influx in the number of laws, the political
and legal structures do not satisfy the dramatically changing needs of
an international business economy.6 °
The Chinese legal system took a big step in 1997, when the 15th
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party amended the Party's
charter by adding that the Party would abide by "the Socialist Rule of
law" as its goal by 2010.61 This amendment establishes, at least in
theory, that high-ranking Communist Party members must abide by
the rule of law.62
While the "rule of law" exists in theory, China suffers from
inconsistent interpretation of the laws and the Constitution. 63 Existing
legislation contradicts the Chinese Constitution.64 Another problem
59. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 239 (describing the National People's
Congress' zealous efforts to create an institution of law that can support the market
economy).
60. See JENNIFER CHANG & MICHAEL WANG, THE U.S. EMBASSY, BEIJING,
CHINA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FY 2004: A GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA AND INFORMATION ON CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 6 (2004)
(describing the Chinese government's difficulties in balancing its long term goal of
opening up financial markets and attracting foreign investment with the need to
retain strict control over its political power), at http://www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/fcs/pdf/ccg.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
61. See Jiang Zemin, Report to the 15th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party, sec. VI (Sept. 12, 1997) (recognizing that the Party must adhere
to the law institutionally and legally to guarantee political stability for the country),
http://www.fas.org/news/china/ 1997/970912-prc.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
62. See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial
Reform, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 9, 264 (2003) (translating and quoting
comments by leading legal experts including Professor Jiang Ping who celebrated
the policy as a major shift in the country's development strategy); see also
PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 2 (explaining how the definition of "rule of law" is
a contested concept). Peerenboom states that the basic definition is "a system in
which law is able to impose meaningful restrains on the state and individual
members of the ruling elite." Id.
63. See id. at 271 (stating that there are laws that conflict with the
constitutional provisions that protect citizens from arrest without court orders, and
that protect citizens from forced labor).
64. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 317 (noting that the authority of the
courts often led to interpretations that were inconsistent with original legislation).
One study estimated that in the mid-1980s in Hebei, Beijin, and Tianjin, about
two-thirds of local regulations were inconsistent with the Constitution. Id. at 241-
42. Compare ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution of the
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that plagues much of Chinese legislation is the vagueness that the
legislation has built into the laws.65 Vagueness leaves room for
provinces to adjust the laws to suit their particular needs, but
vagueness has often simply left room for corruption and inconsistent
administration of laws.66 When local governments can enact
regulations that are not in line with the central government's
regulations because of vagueness in the laws, complicated and
overlapping government restrictions can impede the growth of the
franchise structure.67
Legal conflicts can be resolved in courts or through arbitration.
The Chinese courts cannot actually interpret the laws because this
right is reserved by the National People's Congress ("NPC") and the
Standing Committee.68 According to the Law on Legislation, only the
People's Republic of China] art. 36 (1982) [hereinafter XIANFA] ("No state organ,
public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe
in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do
not believe in, any religion."), http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/law/const03.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004), with Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, China Tightens Laws
Against Falun Gong, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2001 (outlining the Communist Party's
campaign efforts to eradicate Falun Gong activities),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1383156.stm (last visited Feb. 13,
2004). The Falun Gong faith is a nonviolent form of personal belief and practice,
which the Chinese government has forbidden. See H.R. Con. Res. 188, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted) (citing that the Chinese government has created an
organization called "610," whose sole purpose is to get rid of the Falun Gong
through brainwashing, torture, and murder).
65. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 251 (noting that the Confucian
philosophy and socialist theory favor laws that are general principles rather than
specific codes of law).
66. See id. at 475-92 (discussing the effect of rule of law on the different
sectors of the economy); see also Illuminating China's Provinces, Municipalities &
Autonomous Regions (listing the thirty-four different areas, and the geographic
conditions, population and ethic makeup, and economic conditions for each
region), at http://www.china.org.cn/englishlfeatures/43470.htm (last visited Feb.
13, 2004).
67. See English & Xau, supra note 28, at 42 (stating that local governments
and individual agencies each have separate procedures that companies must follow
for setting up a business in a city).
68. See The Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 7 (2000)
(establishing the lawmaking scope of the NPC),
http://www.novexcn.com/legislat-law_00.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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legislature can interpret and repeal statutes.69 Despite the Supreme
People's Court's ability to handle disputes, the case decisions do not
serve as precedent, as China has a civil law system.70 In recent years,
in response to the influx of more technical cases, subject area
specific courts, like intellectual property courts, have been set up at
the provincial level to handle specialized fields.7
Arbitration is the preferred means of dispute resolution in China.72
As China is a signatory to the New York Convention of 1958, it also
recognizes and enforces foreign arbitral awards.73 The New York
Convention requires signatories to implement arbitration decisions
from member states utilizing the arbitration procedures of the
territory where the arbitration order was relied upon.74 In ratifying
69. See id. arts. 42-47 (indicating that because the lawmaking power rests
solely with the NPC, courts are not permitted to interpret the law).
70. See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL
PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 4 (1997) (explaining the legal
process through which cases are heard). The highest court in China is the Supreme
People's Court; below it at the provincial level are the High People's Courts;
beneath that are the Intermediate People's Courts in the provinces, autonomous
regions, and within centrally administered cities; and at the bottom are the Basic
People's Courts. Id.
71. See PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 28 (2003) (noting
that many courts in China have established a "chamber of intellectual property
adjudication," staffed with younger, better-trained judges specializing in
intellectual property cases).
72. See WANG, supra note 56, at 293 (suggesting that the amount of legislation
involving arbitration reflects the preference for arbitration over litigation).
Arbitration in China is governed by Chapter 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
the People's Republic of China, The Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of
China, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, and the CMAC Arbitration Rules. Id.
73. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, (New York Convention of 1958), Jun. 7, 1959, art. 3, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring signatory countries to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards),
http://www/unicitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2004).
74. See id. art. 5 (discussing when foreign arbitral awards are not enforceable).
Awards are not enforceable when the agreement is not valid under the applicable
law, or when the parties are legally incapacitated; the party was not given notice or
was not allowed to present its case; the award went beyond the bounds of the terms
submitted to arbitration; the parties had not agreed to the arbiters or the procedures,
or absent agreement, were not in keeping with the country's arbitration procedures;
or when the award has been set aside, suspended, or is not binding. Id. Member
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the New York Convention, China reserved the right to only
recognize contractual or non-contractual relationships that are
recognized under Chinese law.75 This reservation of power may
make arbitration awards in private contractual agreements against the
Chinese government and state owned enterprises unenforceable.76
In both litigation and arbitration, there has been difficulty in the
enforcement of decisions.77 One frequently cited reason for this
difficulty is China's "corruption culture. 78 China is set to implement
new laws in 2004 targeting this corruption and attempting to
eliminate much of the red tape that foreign enterprises must face.79
states cannot impose "substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or
charges" for the recognition or enforcement of the foreign arbitration decision than
conditions and fees placed upon domestic arbitration parties. Id. art. 3.
75. See John Shijian Mo, Non-Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement, in
CHINESE LAW 757, 797 (Wang Guiguo & John Mo eds., 1999) (listing the two
reservations that China made when ratifying the New York Convention in 1986).
Besides this provision, China also will not enforce awards made in countries that
do not enforce awards made in China. Id.
76. See id. (hypothesizing that non-commercial disputes and commercial
business dispute settlements that the Chinese government participates in overseas
may not be enforced in China).
77. See James V. Feinerman, The Give and Take of Central-Local Relations,
CHINA Bus. REv., Jan. 1998 (citing an example where the Florida firm Revpower
was unable to enforce an internationally recognized arbitration award), 1998 WL
10921709.
78. See Chinese Judiciary and Legal Experts Meet to Discuss Curbing
Corruption, CHINA COURT, Aug. 14, 2003 (reporting on the public concern that
has arisen over widespread government corruption),
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3205 (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
Since 1998, there were about 207,103 cases related to official bribery and
malpractice with prosecution of 12,830 middle and high level officials. Id.
79. See Majority of Corruption Cases in China Linked to Licensing: Official,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 30, 2003 (reporting that the law will attempt to eliminate
corrupt government practices through administrative regulations that will take
effect on July 1, 2004),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/30/eng20030830_ 123408.shtml (last
visited Feb. 28, 2003). The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
created the law because government officials were amassing profits by requiring
several permits and collecting fees for these permits. Id.; see also Chinese
Judiciary and Legal Experts Meet to Discuss Curbing Corruption, supra note 78
(describing the corrupt political environment in China).
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These affirmative steps have helped to alleviate foreign investor
concerns.
80
D. TRADEMARK REGULATIONS AND TRADE SECRET PROTECTIONS
1. Trademark Laws
The Chinese government allocates trademarks on a "first-to-
register" system and franchisors do not need to provide evidence of
prior use of the mark.8 One exception to this rule gives priority to
those trademarks that are used on a commodity in a display at an
international exhibition recognized or organized by the Chinese
government.82 Another exception to the "first-to-register" system
exists when the mark is "well-known."83 When a third party is using
the same or similar well-known mark of an unregistered party in
China, the owner of the well-known mark can then file a complaint
with a local Administration for Industry and Commerce office
80. See John Zhengdong Huang, China on the Horizon: Exploring Current
Legal Issues: An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People's
Republic of China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 471, 494 (1995) (concluding that
wide-scale economic and legal reforms have alleviated foreign investor concerns
by providing a basic legal framework through which investors can seek
protection).
81. See CHANG & WANG, supra note 60 (providing basic overview of
trademark protections and determining that a "first-to-register" trademark system
can make well-known foreign trademarks vulnerable to registration by third parties
in China); see also Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China:
Trademark Law, ch. I, art. 3 & ch. VII, art. 51 (1982) (providing trademark
registrants with the exclusive right to use the mark for approved goods and
services), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200310/20030100063803_1 .xml
(last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
82. See Trademark Law Amended to Better Protect Famous Brands, BUSINESS
ALERT-CHINA, Nov. 15, 2001 (describing changes in Chinese trademark law), at
http://www.tdctrade.com/alert/cba-eOl1ld.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004); see
also Trademark Law, ch. II, art. 25 (stating that an applicant attempting to claim
this priority must file an application to register the mark within six months of the
date of exhibition).
83. See JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 320-21 (1999) (defining the procedures for
foreign and domestic business to obtain "well-known" status for trademark
protection in China). Certification for "well-known" status gives the owner of the
mark three years in which others are barred from using or simulating the mark. Id.
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("AIC").84 The trademark does not need to be well-known in China if
it is well-known internationally." If the business is well-known
internationally,8 6  the Chinese Trademark Office can grant
certification that the mark is well-known.8 7
Trademark owners can seek administrative relief from the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") if the owner
believes that there has been an infringement of trademark rights.88
Trademark holders can also seek relief from intermediate-level
84. See FENG, supra note 71, at 339 (stating that the AICs are responsible for
handling domestic applications, renewals, assignments, and investigating
infringement).
85. See News, CCPIT-Patent and Trademark Law Office: IKEA vs. CINET -
First foreign related domain name case cited (describing a case involving Inter Ikea
Systems B.V. and Beijing CINet Co. Ltd., where a domestic Chinese enterprise
had registered the top level domain name "ikea.com.cn"). The Chinese enterprise
argued that at the time of infringement when the trademark was registered, "Ikea"
could not have been a well-known name because it had not been used in China. Id.
However, the court determined that Ikea was a well-known mark internationally
and as such deserved protection. Id.
86. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Trademark
Law, art. 14 (stating that business can submit, as evidence, information to prove
that they are well known, including: the duration of the publicity of the mark, data
supporting the amount of public recognition of the mark in the particular
commercial area, and economic ranking of the business versus other competitors);
see also Edward Eugene Lehman et al., Well-Known Trademark Protection in the
People's Republic of China-Evolution of the System, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 257,
259 (2003) (stating that Pizza Hut was the first company to achieve well-known
status in China, when it proved its well-known status through evidence of the
mark's registration in over forty countries). In this case, an Australian company
applied for registration of the trademark "Pizza Hut" for cake and powder products
in China, but the application was rejected and it was determined that the Pizza Hut
trademark was well-known. Id.
87. See Lehman, supra note 86, at 260 (stating that no foreign trademark has
been granted well-known mark certification outside of the standard registration
process).
88. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 83, at 322-23 (stating that the SAIC has
authority to issue cease and desist orders, to destroy products containing the
infringing trademark, to impose fines up to fifty percent of the total sales of the
infringing goods or up to five times the profit garnered from the infringement
provided that the fine is up to RMB 10,000 (about U.S. $1,208), and to order
trademark infringers to compensate rightful owners).
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people's courts that specialize in intellectual property law. 9 Chinese
lawmakers intended that trademark protections in China protect the
trademark holder's right to use a trademark, with a focus on
protecting consumer interests. 90 In registering a trademark, the users
of this trademark are responsible for the quality of the goods sold
under the trademark.91
2. Trade Secret Protection
Franchises can protect their trade secrets through contractual
agreement 92  and the Anti-Unfair Competition law.93  "Unfair
competition" is defined as activities that might damage the legal
rights and interests of others, and "disturb the order of [the] social
economy."94 Under the law, businesses are prohibited from stealing
business secrets, disclosing business secrets, allowing others to use
trade secrets, or violating trade secret contracts.95 However, these
trade secrets are only protected if they fall under the requirements of
the statute; business information- not listed in - the law is not
89. See FENG, supra note 71, at 25-26 (listing the level of courts in the People's
Court system, of which the intermediate courts preside over issues at the municipal
level).
90. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Trademark
Law, art. 1 (describing the general purpose of Chinese trademark law).
91. See id. art. 7 (discussing the responsibility that trademark owners have for
the quality of the goods sold under their mark).
92. See SHANGHAI ZHONGYI LAW FIRM, FRANCHISE AND LEGAL SERVICE OF
FRANCHISE 8 (2003) [hereinafter SHANGHAI ZHONGYI] (determining that a
franchisor can create and enter into a trade secret agreement that requires the
franchisee to keep the trade secrets and not disclose or transfer the secrets),
http://www.ccfa.org.cn/end.jsp?id=4777 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
93. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art.
10 (1993) (prohibiting business practices that might impede the development of the
social market economy), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
Managers cannot steal another's business secrets, nor can they disclose, use, or
permit others to use these business secrets. Id. The article stipulates that these
business secrets must be maintained as secrets by the legal owners to gain
protection. Id.
94. Id. art. 2.
95. See id. (imposing legal obligations on managers to "abide by the principle
of voluntariness, equality, impartiality, honesty and good faith," and to maintain a
"public commercial morale").
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guaranteed protection.96 Many corporations have chosen to take the
additional step of protecting intellectual property through contractual
agreements.97
E. CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA
Generally, contractual agreements are beneficial because they help
to limit a party's risk.98 The Uniform Contract Law primarily governs
contracts in China, but commercial contracts also fall under the
General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
and the Secured Interest Law of the People's Republic of China.99
Prior to the recent enactment of China's Uniform Contract Law,
contracts suffered from an emphasis on procedural formalities °° and
inconsistencies between different codes that governed contracts. 101
96. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art.
10 (protecting trade secrets only where the information is not known to the public,
where the information can provide economic benefit to the owner and has practical
applicability, and finally, where the owner has taken steps to keep the information
confidential).
97. See SHANGHAI ZHONGYI, supra note 92, at 7 (advising franchisors that they
should create trade secret agreements with franchisees and employees).
98. See GAMBLE, supra note 46, at 7 (limiting a contractor's risk in two ways:
first, the contract helps to record the terms of a deal for future reference, and
second, the contract helps to provide a legal framework in case of unforeseen
contingencies).
99. See James M. Zimmerman et al., People's Republic of China, 34 INT'L L.
883, 883-84 (2000) (describing how the Civil Law, the Secured Interests Law, and
the Uniform Contract Law, supersede the Economic Contract Law, the Foreign
Economic Contract Law, the Technology Contract Law, and the Technology
Import Contract Regulations, which formerly governed contracts).
100. Compare James C. Hitchingham, Recent Development: Stepping Up to the
Needs of the International Market Place: An Analysis of the 1999 "Uniform"
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 8, 7
(2000) (discussing how, according to the 1999 "Uniform" Contract Law, contracts
can now be "written, oral, or 'in another form"'), with General Principles of the
Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 56-57 (1987),
http://www.cietac-sz.org.cn/cietac/English/Convention/Gpocl2.htm (last visited
Feb. 11, 2004), The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China,
art. 3 (1981), http://www.novexcn.com/economiccontract.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2004), and Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 7, translated in 24 I.L.M.
797, 799 (1985) (noting that under previous contract laws, contracts with foreign
parties had to be written while contracts among Chinese parties could be oral); see
also Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development
and a Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 162 (2001) (explaining
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The new contract law might seem familiar to Westerners because
it borrows both terminology and provisions from civil and common
law. 10 2 The Uniform Contract Law emphasizes the protection of the
rights and duties of the parties. 103 However, unlike the traditional
contract laws at common law, Chinese contract law distinguishes
between the different types of contractsial relationships.1" Chinese
contract law places strong emphasis on good faith dealing, which
underlies the Uniform Contract Law and other Chinese laws.1 05
During and even after a contract terminates, the law imposes an
obligation upon parties to perform duties of "notice, assistance,
confidentiality etc. conforming to the principle of good faith and in
accordance with trade usage." ' 6 While the law permits standard
contract provisions, the party providing these provisions "shall
ascertain the rights and duties of the parties pursuant to the principle
of fairness."'0 7 Similarly, the party using these boilerplate provisions
that under the former Economic Contract Law, contracts that failed to include
certain specific terms were void).
101. See Chen, supra note 100, at 154 (arguing that the different requirements of
the previous system of three different contract laws reflected a need for a less
chaotic and uniform system of contract law).
102. See WANG, supra note 56, at 76 (stating that while the contract law
borrows language from common law jurisdictions, the definitional and contextual
meanings are not the same).
103. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, arts. 2-3, 5-6 (2003) [hereinafter Contract Law] (stating that parties to a
contract are of equal status, that they must determine rights and duties based upon
principles of fairness, and that the parties must perform their duties in good faith),
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn!article/200301/20030100064766_ l.xml
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004). Contractual agreements consist of offer and
acceptance, but the Contract Law does not include a requirement for consideration.
Id. art. 13.
104. See generally id. chs. 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, & 23 (creating separate
regulations for twenty-one different types of commercial transactions including:
sales contracts, contracts for loan, contracts for lease, contracts for work, contracts
for technology, contracts for deposit, contracts for commission, and contracts for
brokerage).
105. See id. art. 6 (requiring that "parties shall exercise their rights and perform
their duties in accordance with the principle of good faith."); see also id. art. 7
(stating that parties must respect "social morality" and cannot harm the public
interest).
106. Id. arts. 92-93.
107. Id. ch. 2, art. 39.
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must draw attention to provisions that might exclude or restrict
liability. 10 8
The most significant change the Uniform Contract Law
effectuated was the elimination of the requirement that contracting
parties be economic organizations. 10 9 Now, under the Uniform
Contract Law, individuals are permitted to contract with foreign
entities. 110 Under the changes in contract law, franchisors can
franchise directly to Chinese individual franchisees while still
obtaining contractual protections."II
Another significant change includes the transformation from the
old law, which had different requirements for domestic, foreign, and
technology contracts, to the new Contract Law, which governs all
contracts." 2 Foreign parties to a contract may choose which law to
apply in contractual disputes." 3 In JVs, however, the laws of the
108. See id. (requiring that when contracts have standard clauses, a party must
bring the other party's attention to clauses that create or limit the obligations of
parties and, where necessary, provide explanations).
109. See Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 2, translated in 24 I.L.M. 797,
799 (1985) (stating that under Chinese contract law, individuals could not contract
with foreign enterprises).
110. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 2 (noting that contractual relationships can exist between "natural
persons, legal persons or other associations that are subjects of equal status").
111. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 83, at 113 (determining that China has
developed contract law from a paternalistic approach to a more open approach that
recognizes freedom of contract for individuals).
112. See Zhao Yuhong, Law of Contract, in CHINESE LAW, supra note 75, at
217, 222-25 (describing the triplet contract legislation that included the Economic
Contract Law, the Foreign Economic Contract Law, and the Technology Contract
Law). The Foreign Economic Contract Law governed contracts with foreign
entities and was supplemented by other laws, including the Joint Equity Ventures
Law and the Joint Co-operative Ventures Law. Id. at 223. The Economic Contract
Law governed legal persons and clarified domestic parties' rights and obligations.
Id. at 222.
113. See Luo Junming, Choice of Law for Contracts in China: A Proposal for
the Objectivization of Standards and Their Use in Conflicts of Law, 6 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 439, 441-42 (1996) (interpreting the Supreme Court of the People's
Republic of China as providing that parties can agree upon a choice of law clause
in their contracts).
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People's Republic of China will apply. 1 4 Contracts can also
determine the means of dispute resolution. 15 Parties in China
typically consult and mediate prior to litigation or arbitration." 6
II. ANALYSIS
Doing business under the rule of law in China poses significant
opportunities for financial gain. Franchise investors must be fully
aware of the legal risks under Chinese law and the legal structure
when considering franchising in China." 7 In planning, franchisors
should carefully consider the legal implications of each type of
foreign investment structure." 8  After selecting a structure,
franchisors should then carefully examine relevant laws and the level
of legal enforcement typically provided by intellectual property,
contract, and dispute resolution laws. 19 Based on the laws and
114. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 126 (mandating that when a choice of law provision is not included, the
law of the country most closely connected with the contract will be used).
115. See generally Erik B. Wulff, Dispute Resolution: Choice of Law and
Forum, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 26, at
305, 307 (discussing the significance of the choice of law and forum agreements).
116. See WANG, supra note 56, at 282 (noting that the practice of "joint
conciliation" has become common). In this process, the Chinese party will apply to
an arbitration commission or conciliation center, and the foreign party will apply to
an arbitration or conciliation organization from its own country. Id. Then these
institutions form a joint committee to settle the matter. Id.
117. See U.S. COMMERCIAL SERVICE-CHINA, CONTACT CHINA: A RESOURCE
GUIDE FOR DOING BUSINESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9-10 (2002)
(discussing some of the problems that foreign investors ought to be aware of when
entering the Chinese business market, including: lack of predictability in the
business environment, bureaucratic local protectionism, remnants of the state
planned economy, and general over-enthusiasm),
http://www.business.gov/busadv/frame.cftn?urltest=http://www.mac.doc.gov/china
/chinagateway.html&catid=94&urlplace=maincat.cfim (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
118. See UNIDROIT, supra note 40, at 2-5 (advising franchisors to carefully
consider the legal environment, such as what type of control the sub-franchisor
will have in the master franchise agreement).
119. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying the many other laws
that govern franchising including taxation, labor, and real property laws).
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accompanying levels of protection, businesses can determine the best
means of maintaining control and protecting the franchise system.
20
A. DEVELOPING A BUSINESS STRUCTURE
Many franchisors are attempting to enter or further their business
in the Chinese market. 121 Without proof of success in the Chinese
market, a franchise business is unlikely to attract quality franchisee
applicants. 22 Because the franchise structure does not have a long
history under Chinese law, potential franchisees may not understand
the value of the franchise brand name and the support that a franchise
system can provide. 23 Franchisees may be reluctant to pay the high
costs of franchising and the royalty fees involved. 124 Therefore, proof
of success in China may be necessary before franchisees are willing
to bypass opening up their own small businesses in favor of a
franchise. 25
120. See Riesterer, supra note 34, at 54 (noting that ceding control over
selection of sub-franchisees, training, and marketing can put the franchise system
at a disadvantage, however, master franchise agreements remain extremely popular
and successful strategies).
121. See Review on the 4th China Franchise Convention & Exhibition (citing
statistics compiled by the China Chain Store and Franchise Association that by the
first half of 2002, there were over 1000 franchisors in over forty business
categories), at http://www.ccfa.org.cn/5th/2OO3_e4.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2003).
122. See Asia's First Institute of Franchising Set Up in China, supra note 30
(stating that the rapid growth in franchising created a severe shortage in qualified
personnel which poses an additional challenge for potential business
entrepreneurs).
123. See Mark Spitalnik, Can Franchising Work in the PRC?, CHINA Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 2003 (determining that potential business owners would rather spend
money on tangible goods like machinery and technology, rather than pay franchise
fees and royalties),
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0309/franchising.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2004).
124. See id. (concluding that the potential franchisees felt that their money was
better spent on starting their own small businesses, rather than a franchise).
125. See id. (arguing that where a franchise has successful company-owned
stores in China, potential franchisees would see the value of a franchise and be
more willing to pay franchise and royalty fees).
2004] 973
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1. Initial Entry into the Chinese Market
Successful U.S. franchisors entering the Chinese market have
often tested out their franchise with company-owned stores prior to
granting rights to franchisees. 26 When franchisors begin to open and
operate their own test stores, they can determine what modifications
to the business model are necessary to build a consumer base in
China."2 7 Immediately granting legal franchise rights to a franchisee
or even a master franchisee without first testing out the viability of
the franchise within China could depreciate the quality of the
trademark and franchise globally. 28
When first opening an outlet, franchisors can open the store as a
WFOE, a CJV, or an EJV.'29 All three business formats have pros
and cons, and the decision of how to begin franchising in China
depends upon availability of resources, financial capital, human
capital, and notoriety of the franchise. 3 °
126. See Yan, supra note 51 (stating that McDonald's has not yet entered the
franchise market, and has opted to maintain direct control over stores, but has,
nevertheless, initiated the franchising process in China); see also ANDREW J.
SHERMAN, FRANCHISING & LICENSING: Two POWERFUL WAYS TO GROW YOUR
BUSINESS IN ANY ECONOMY 13-15 (2004) (citing a proven prototype location and
proven methods of operation and management, among several other factors, as
essential to the creation of a responsible franchise foundation).
127. See, e.g., Dunkin' Donuts, FOOD AND DRINK WEEKLY, Mar. 13, 2000
(noting that Dunkin' Donuts stores in China closed down because the sweet
American pastries did not fit the Chinese palate), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/mOEUY/10_6/60596905/pl/article.jhtml (last
visited Feb. 12 2004).
128. See Jia Hepeng, Hoteliers Up Rivalry by Franchising, BUSINESS WEEKLY,
July 2, 2002 (quoting Jerry Huang, deputy president of the China Development
Department of Six Continents, the largest hotel group in the world, as stating that
franchise expansion in China could endanger the group brand if the franchisees do
not meet the brand's strict standards),
http://www 1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-07/02/content_127156.htm (last
visited February 12, 2004).
129. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text (describing the unique
characteristics of each of these foreign investment enterprises).
130. See Kenneth S. Kaplan, Deciding to Go International: Organizational and
Business Considerations, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING,
supra note 26, at 14, 16 (urging franchisors to seriously consider the pros and cons
of expanding the franchise internationally). Financial resources are needed to
retain experienced local counsel, registration for licenses and intellectual property
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a. The WFOE as the Test Outlet
The WFOE allows the foreign investor to have direct control over
operations, but may cause substantial difficulties in navigating local
laws and establishing localized business relationships."' Various
benefits that attach to the WFOE include a greater ability to protect
intellectual property and the ability to select favorable choice of law
provisions and dispute resolution mechanisms. 3 ' However, problems
that can arise with the WFOE include a company's inability to
understand local laws and regional business practices.133 Lack of
legal and cultural understanding on the part of companies, coupled
with China's historical bias against foreigners and large corporations,
can prove to be heavy burdens for a company entering the Chinese
market to establish a franchise.'34 Similarly, regional interpretations
of national laws and the corruption that the vague laws engender can
prove to be unexpected challenges even for those individuals well-
versed in the national Chinese legal structure. 3 '
rights, recruiting skills management professionals, investing in the initial site, and
translation of the franchise operation materials. Id. at 17-19.
131. See generally Anyuan Yuan, Foreign Direct Investements in China--
Practical Problems of Complying with China's Company Law and Laws for
Foreign-Invested Enterprises, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 475 (2000) (describing
the practical problems and difficulties WFOEs face in unraveling the intricacies
and inconsistencies of Chinese law).
132. See WFOE Rules, supra note 31, part 13, art. 81 (stating that when a
WFOE signs a contract with another entity, the contract law of China will apply).
133. See KONG QINGJIANG, CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 34-35 (2002) (stating that one reason WTO compliance will
be difficult is because transparency of laws is required on all levels, and there is no
official compilation for laws and regulations on a local and national level in
China).
134. See WANG, supra note 56, at 97-98 (noting that a key advantage to
establishing a JV, rather than a WFOE, is that there is lower financial contribution
needed, which lessens risk, and Chinese partners may be in a better position to
know the procedures for obtaining permits and licenses).
135. See infra notes 184-199 and accompanying text (describing how there are
contradictions between laws and regulations, and how vagueness in the laws can
be interpreted in dramatically different ways in each region).
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b. The Joint Venture as the Test Outlet
The Chinese government intended the JV to be a short-term
business structure that would bring new technology and business
skills to the country. 3 6 Accordingly, companies should think
carefully about long-term business goals prior to creating a JV. 117
Historically, JVs have not been very successful in China because the
objectives of the parties are often different.138
JVs do have the advantage of providing corporations with a local
liaison who is familiar with regional business practices. 13 9 Besides
the liason's factual knowledge, the value of the liason's
understanding of regional cultural mores should not be
underestimated. 140 The combination of local cultural awareness and
an understanding of common business practices, allows the foreign
investor's JV to reduce the risk of overlooking critical steps in
business development.' 4' Risk is similarly reduced because if the
136. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining how the Chinese
government views the JV as a short term venture, designed to stay with the
Chinese counterpart eventually).
137. See WANG, supra note 56, at 98 (citing disadvantages to a JV including
problems that arise when there are different management styles, when partners
who obtain access to business secrets later become competitors, and when Chinese
nationals are in control of part of the company and the Chinese government has
more control over daily operations as a result).
138. See GAMBLE, supra note 46, at 157 (attributing the lack of success to the
fact that foreign partners may have long-term development goals with several JVs,
while Chinese partners are more concerned with short- term profits of the
particular JV).
139. See Riesterer, supra note 34, at 54 (suggesting that JVs have several
advantages including better access to natural and human resources, and knowledge
of business customs, as well as the structural advantage of sharing profits and
losses to minimize the risk involved in the venture).
140. See Spitalnik, supra note 123 (describing a case study of an international
sign and banner franchise with successful franchisees in over twenty countries that
was unable to successfully franchise in China). The franchise soon discovered that
Chinese consumers were less willing to pay higher prices for more durable signs
from one location when there were cheaper alternatives they could obtain from
shopping around. Id.
141. See Kaplan, supra note 130, at 27-33 (enumerating several factors that
foreign investors would be unfamiliar with, including local zoning codes,
taxations, restrictions on hiring, legal codes, etc.).
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enterprise fails, the financial burdens of the failure will be evenly
distributed amongst the parties.
142
2. Developing the Franchise System
After creating initial stores and gauging the success of these stores
in the Chinese markets, franchisors should consider the development
and ownership of a franchise system. 43 Long term considerations
should guide the initial introduction of the franchise system.' 44
Franchisors who franchise directly have similar advantages to a
WFOE because of the direct control over the franchise's
operations. 145 Similarly, direct franchising forces foreign investors to
take on the full costs associated with creating a franchise system.1 46
Where franchisors decide to engage in master and development
franchising, there are several benefits to master, development, and
JV agreements.1 47 Similarly, these agreements allow the franchisor to
have the resources of a Chinese company that is more familiar with
142. See China Council for the Promotion of International Trade & China
Chamber of International Commerce, Foreign Investment (describing how key
characteristics of JVs have attracted foreign investment to China at a 16.72% rate
of increase), http://app.ccpit.org/vhosts/english/IV.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
JVs invest, manage, and share risks together proportionally. Id.
143. See Kaplan, supra note 130, at 20 (advising the franchisor to consider how
to compromise the franchise's existing structure with efforts towards building an
international franchise system). Franchisors should consider whether there will be
offices in these other countries, and examine whether these offices will have
taxation and labor relations implications. Id. at 20-21.
144. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (explaining that foreign
investors need to consider both the size and scope of business operations, as well
as long-term business goals, to comport with China's goals for the JV in general).
145. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (describing the various
advantages that a WFOE has when doing business in China as compared to other
business structures).
146. See Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 3 (alluding to the expensive costs of
opening an initial franchise outlet because of the additional financial and human
resources necessary to assist the outlet with conforming the franchise system to the
differences in language, culture, and customs).
147. See id. at 27 (arguing that while costs for master and development
franchising are lower, franchisers who have adequate financial and human
resources should select direct franchising because it minimizes the risk that a third
party will damage the future of the franchise system).
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the regional business practices in China. 4 8 Problems in master
development and V agreements can arise if a franchisor selects a
poor franchise developer or sub-franchisor. 49 Substantial problems
can arise in a working relationship which involves two or more
parties that have separate and sometimes conflicting business
interests. 150
Initially, these types of franchise agreements require research into
suitable partners and China does not have simple means, like a basic
national credit system, to screen potential business partners. 5' Even
after parties select suitable partners, problems in the working
relationship can arise. 52 One more recent and significant problem
involved with the JV is the failure of JV parties to submit their
promised shares of capital.'53 Similarly, business partners may
improperly take advantage of the relationships.'54 Besides potential
148. See UNIDROIT, supra note 40, at 16 (noting that cultural considerations
can have implications as to the willingness of individuals to be franchisees, and as
to whether particular products or services will be well-received).
149. See Konigsberg, supra note 36, at 27 (stating that the best sub-franchisors
and developers are those with similar business philosophies and management
styles as the chief executive officer of the franchise system, and who have an
entrepreneurial ability that is balanced by an ability to work within the pre-existing
franchise system).
150. See Z.Y. James Fang & David K.Y. Tang, The Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprise Law: Defining the Legislative History and Interpreting the Statute, 2 J.
CHINESE L. 153, 155 (1988) (discussing how problems in a partnership can arise in
China because there is no well-developed information network to research
potential partners, and that after a partner is selected, there are often differences in
managerial style and ideology).
151. See Christopher M. Vaughn, Venture Capital in China: Developing a
Regulatory Framework, 16 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 227, 235-36 (2002) (displaying the
need for venture capital to overcome a pattem of insufficient self-financing). The
lack of screening procedures and information to distinguish between promising and
problematic bank loan applicants often creates difficulties for small businesses
attempting to finance their debt. Id. at 236.
152. See Fang & Tang, supra note 150, at 155 (stating that cultural differences
can prove to be a hurdle in the working relationship).
153. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 69 (recommending that foreign investment
enterprises establish a schedule of payment to help solve this problem).
154. See id. at 79 (determining that the foreign investor can be at a serious
disadvantage in these situations because the local Chinese party typically controls
the supply of utilities to the JV). Even when the details of the relationship are
established in a contract, and contractual provisions preclude competition between
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working relationship problems with partners, the franchisor will also
have to share profits from franchising fees with the other parties.'55
When developing a business structure, franchises should also pay
close attention to the legal system and the sometimes overlapping
and contradictory laws that govern foreign investments in China. 15 6
B. NAVIGATING PROBLEMS WITHIN CHINA'S FRAMEWORK OF
LAWS
China has eagerly pursued a stronger legal system and stronger
legal protections.'57 China wants to provide a stronger legal
framework to entice foreign investors and to gain legitimacy
internationally.5 8 The sheer amount of legislative work that China
has undertaken indicates that the government is serious about
developing the socialist market economy through WTO
compliance. 5 9 However, passage of these laws has not solved all of
the parties, there have been cases where these anti-competition agreements have
not prevented Chinese business partners from copying marketing strategies,
management techniques and even product development methods to improve their
own products. Id. at 78. When these anti-competition issues arise, litigation of
these issues can be time-consuming and will likely destroy the working
relationship. Id. at 79.
155. See Riesterer, supra note 34, at 44 (explaining the method of franchisors in
developing area agreements among multiple franchisees).
156. See Peter Howard Come, Creation and Application of the Law in the PRC,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 374 (2002) (characterizing the laws as problematic
because of undefined terms, vagueness, omissions, and "catch all" clauses).
157. See Paul Gerwitz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 603, 604 (2003) (listing some factors that reflect the changes in
China's legal environment). While there were only two law schools and fewer than
3000 lawyers in 1979, there are now more than 200 law schools and over 100,000
lawyers. Id.
158. See Huang, supra note 80, at 471-72 (noting that one step the government
has taken to attract foreign investors is to establish Shenzhen, Shantou, Xiamen,
Zhuhai, Hainan Island, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Quingdao,
Lianyungang, Nanton, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou,
Zhanjian, and Beihai as areas where foreign investors can receive preferential
treatment in their economic activities).
159. See Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 97, 104 (2003) (stating that the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation reviewed over 1,400 laws
and regulations, while the State Council reviewed over 2,300 laws and regulations
to prepare for WTO membership).
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the problems that currently exist in China's legal framework that can
threaten the quality and success of a franchise.16 °
1. Lack of Transparency and Corruption
The change to a "rule of law" system may not be fully
implemented for many years; however, the change recognizes the
correlation between economic growth and the rule of law through the
strengthening of institutions and transparency of laws.16' This change
is consistent with China's entrance into the WTO, which requires
that member nations have laws that are executed in a "uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.' 1 62 Also consistent with China's
WTO accession, China's Supreme Court has requested that courts
make decisions public which, while not legally binding, can serve as
a guide to potential litigants on how judges may rule.'63
Vagueness in the law gives judges, administrators, local
government officials, and other persons in power the latitude to
construe laws in ways that serve their own interests.' 64 One notable
characteristic of Chinese laws is the vagueness inherent in the
160. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 268 (arguing that China has a thin rule
of law because the regulatory framework and the legal institution itself need
further development).
161. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003:
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A DYNAMIC WORLD, TRANSFORMING
INSTITUTIONS, GROWTH, AND QUALITY OF LIFE 194 (2003) (recommending that
developing countries strengthen the rule of law and good governance to increase
consumer and investor confidence), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/ 17960_WDR_2003_chp_9_web.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2004); see also PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 452-53 (explaining
economic historian Douglass North's theory that enforceable property and
competition rules are important for entrepreneurs to reap the benefits of their labor,
which encourages further economic growth and development).
162. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 10, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
163. See Cao Jianming, WTO and the Rule of Law in China, 16 TEMP. INT'L &
COMp. L.J. 379, 388 (2002) (describing how publication of judicial decisions is a
significant step towards transparency in laws). Cao Jianming is the Justice and
Vice President of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China.
Id. at 390.
164. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 251 (stating that wide latitude in
interpretation prevents the law from being predictable and stable).
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wording.'65 In the.Chinese contract law, there are concepts like
"reasonableness," 166 "fair dealing," and "good faith."' 67 While these
terms might seem familiar to foreign franchisors, the terms are not
defined in Chinese jurisprudence. 68 Analysts have argued that this
vagueness was necessary because it allowed local officials to adapt
national laws to their regional needs. 169 However, vagueness is
particularly problematic in contract law because several provisions
refer to vague concepts like principles of faimess. 70 This vagueness
is replicated in several laws.' With these vague concepts of fairness,
judges have wide latitude to use their own discretion, which sets the
framework for corruption. I ,-
Corruption can exist when lower level government officials are
unwilling to enforce laws promulgated by the central government.'73
165. See id. (noting the factors that favor general principles of law that can be
adapted to the vastly different needs of the-various regions).
166. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 19 (2003) [hereinafter Contract Law] (making an offer irrevocable when
the offeree could reasonably rely upon the offer as being irrevocable),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200301/20030100064766_l.xml (last visited
Feb. 11, 2004). The offeree has a "reasonable" amount of time in which to accept a
non-oral offer. Id. art. 23.
167. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 2
(1993) ("Business operator[s] ... shall follow the principles of voluntariness,
equality, fairness, honesty and credibility and observe the generally recognized
business ethics."), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306
(last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
168. See Hitchingham, supra note 100, at 4 (arguing that one of the predominant
problems with the Uniform Contract law is that the law adopted many undefined
foreign legal standards).
169. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 251 (explaining how the vastly
different regions of China have dramatically different needs).
170. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, arts. 5-7 (referring to principles of fairness, good faith, and public interest).
171. See Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, July 1, 1979, art. 1 (mandating
that equity JVs be based on "principles of equality and mutual benefit"),
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw L.htrn (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
172. See GAMBLE, supra note 46, at 16 (suggesting that the concept of fairness
can be interpreted in a manner that suits the judge's individual agenda).
173. See XIANFA, supra note 64, art. 100 ("The people's congresses of provinces
and municipalities directly under the Central Government and their standing
2004]
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Because government officials have substantial power to influence
economic transactions, they also have the power to exact "tea
money," or bribes. 7 4 Even when the laws condemn monetary bribes,
those involved in the practice of gift giving often condone the
activity as guanxi, a Chinese term which can be loosely translated as
"personal relationships."'7 5 This makes the corruption even more
difficult to weed out. 7 6 Even though there are several reasons for the
prevalence of corruption, the solutions for the problem are difficult
to find. 77
The most frequently cited reason for corruption lies in the nexus
between the government and the Communist Party. 17 8 While Article
5 of the Constitution states that no one is above the law, in practice,
committees may adopt local regulations, which must not contravene the
Constitution and the [national] law").
174. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA
AFTER MAO 120 (1999) (stating that some of the powers that government officials
have include granting licenses, providing access to utilities, allowing tax-breaks,
and granting loans); see also Gregory C. Ott, China's Accession into the WTO: The
Practice of International Bribery and the Issues It Presents for American Counsel
Whose Clients Are Doing Business Within the Confines of the Great Wall, 15
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 147, 151 (2001) (attributing widespread bribery and
corruption to China's historical aversion to a rule of law, and the general reliance
on personal relationships to do business).
175. See Kate Hutchings & Georgina Murray, Family, Face, and Favours: Do
Australians Adjust to Accepted Business Conventions in China?, 25 SING. MGMT.
REv. (2003) (noting that laws now exist that specifically prohibit corruption but
that corruption can still exist outside the constraints of these laws), 2003 WL
15844431.
176. See id. at 29 (stating that the distinction between legal and illegal gifts are
based on arbitrary cultural standards that make enforcement of anti-corruption laws
difficult).
177. See WANG, supra note 56, at 30 n. 107 (citing reasons for the prevalence of
corruption, including: the low pay that government employees receive as compared
to private employees, poorly drafted laws, nepotism, and the close relationship
between the Communist Party and the government).
178. See Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach
About Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218,
240-41 (2003) (citing the intertwined relationship between the judicial branch and
the Communist Party as a reason for courts' ineffectiveness at settling intellectual
property disputes).
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the will of the Communist Party prevails over the rule of law. 179 High
level members within the Party, as well as relatives of these
members, enjoy special treatment.8 0 The disconnection between
central and local government, which has provided local officials with
the latitude to normalize the business professional's expectation of
paying bribes and kickbacks, has furthered the problem of
corruption.'81
2. Decentralization of Government
There is growing decentralization of government in China.'82
Poorer provinces often do not have the financial resources to
purchase books that state the new laws and regulations.'83 Even when
local governments have access to national laws and regulations,
poorly drafted laws have widened the gap between the intent of
drafters and implementation of laws.'84 Particularly when the NPC or
the legislators fail to issue interpretations of the laws, regional
governments are left confused about the intent behind the
179. See WANG, supra note 56, at 41 (noting that in spite of Article 5, the fact
that China is under one party rule and has been since 1949 means that the will of
the Party prevails).
180. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, at 34-35 (quoting an interviewee
as stating that gaoganzidi, the children of high level officials, have distinct political
and financial advantages).
181. See id. (arguing that while the Chinese government has made significant
efforts to end corruption, the central government's ability to fix the kickbacks and
favors given on a lower level are questionable).
182. See Feinerman, supra note 77 (outlining the structure of the Chinese central
government and the reasons for the disconnect between the central government and
provinces); see also Li Yahong, The Law-Making Law: A Solution to the Problems
in the Chinese Legislative System?, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 120, 124 (arguing that
decentralization of the government has created local protectionism where
provinces discriminate against outsiders). One example of this protectionism is the
"Battle of the Cars." Id. In June 1999, the Shanghai government imposed a license
plate fee for cars that were purchased from anyone other than Shang Ta Na, a
Shanghainese/German joint venture. Id. at 140 n.22. The Hubei government
retaliated by issuing a similar regulation that imposed a large fee on those who
purchased a Shang Ta Nas car in the Hubei province. Id.
183. See FENG, supra note 71, at 28 (mentioning that courts in poorer areas
cannot afford collections of updated laws).
184. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 251 (concluding that vagueness in
legislation undermines the predictability of laws).
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legislation.185 The government has.-put little effort into eliminating
this problem, and has characterized the contradictions as "natural
phenomena."' 8 6 The government has downplayed the conflicts
between local and national government as inconsequential because
the Legislation Law states that the national law is the controlling
law. 87 However, when resolving conflict of law issues, judges
themselves are sometimes unsure of whether to apply national or
local regulations.'88
Local government is also often unwilling to enforce laws
promulgated by the central government because of local
185. See id. at 257 (using the 1997 State Council bankruptcy notice to
demonstrate that lower level regulations can be developed that are inconsistent
with national legislation). This legislation removes rights from creditors that are
guaranteed under superior legislation. Id.; see also Yahong, supra note 182, at 123-
24 (2000) (discussing how there have been reports where the NPC's jurisdiction
has been usurped by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of
China (NPCSC), or where the NPC and the NPCSC have been usurped by the
State Council and local legislatures).
186. See Come, supra note 156, at 412 (quoting Chinese administrative law
scholars Ying Songnian and Dong Hao's argument that as long as there is no
contradiction between laws, regulations, and the constitution, differences in the
local and national laws are "normal phenomena"). Legal scholars have argued that
these contradictions are acceptable as long they conform to the "spirit" of the law.
Id. This argument is problematic because reliance upon the "spirit" of the law
constitutes reliance upon an ambiguous concept that can be easily shaped by party
leaders. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 65 (defining principles of the "rule of
law" as encompassing clear, accessible, consistent, and enforced laws). Reliance
upon the "spirit" of the law, rather on the "letter" of the law, strongly suggests that
in practice, China may be operating a political system closer to the "rule of man"
rather than the "rule of law." Id. at 56. While the "rule of man" proponents
advocate that law is insufficient to govern and must be supplemented by party
leadership, "rule of law" proponents argue that the laws provide stability and
properly subject party members to the constraints of the law. Id.
187. See The Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 64 (2000)
("Where a national law or administrative regulation enacted by the state has come
into force, any provision in the local decree which contravenes it shall be
invalid."), http://www.novexcn.com/legislatjlaw_0O.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2004).
188. See Come, supra note 156, at 418-19 (citing statistics indicating that when
faced with a conflict between local and national legislation, 64.5% of judges would
use central law and disregard local law, while 27.9% said they would seek the help
of higher state institutions, and 5.4% said they would apply local laws over
national laws).
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protectionism. 8 9 Structurally, local legislation usually includes only
a general statement noting that its formation is in accordance with
relevant laws. 190 The generality of this statement provides wide
latitude through which local governments can provide benefits for
favored local businesses. 19' Often, favoritism shown to local
businesses is shrouded under the concept of guanxi.92 Because local
legislatures allocate judicial resources, the judiciary has a strong
interest in maintaining positive relationships with local businesses
and officials. 193
The disconnect between national legislation and regional
implementation of the legislation has been the main source of
China's inability to fulfill international treaty obligations. 94 China
often does not enforce provisions agreed to in these treaties at the
regional level because local officials can gain financially from the
furtherance of illegal activity. 95 However, particularly in the area of
189. See Feinerman, supra note 77 (determining that the national government
has been unable to live up to promises to foreign corporations because of local
government inaction).
190. See Come, supra note 156, at 390 (contrasting this general statement with
the specificity with which national regulations cite the enacting laws and
regulations that they are based upon).
191. See id. (suggesting, once again, that vagueness in law provides room for
corruption).
192. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, at 27 (noting that China's
business culture is often cited as being rooted in strong family and cultural ties, or
guanxi).
193. See Margaret Y. K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese
Courts in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 170 (Karen G. Turner et
al. eds., 2000) (arguing that self interest forces judges to issue rulings that are
favorable to local residents, or to ignore rulings by other courts that are
unfavorable to local residents).
194. See generally Clarke, supra note 159, at 97-98 (arguing that reforms agreed
to in international treaties may not get enacted because the Chinese central
government has difficulty enacting change). The author notes, however, that this
change is unlikely to be effectuated by international pressures, but will likely be
developed through China's internal legal developments. Id.
195. See, e.g., GAMBLE, supra note 46, at 204 (describing the creative ways in
which local governments have shifted funds to avoid paying taxes, thereby keeping
a larger portion of tax money for themselves). Often, illegal copyright and
trademark activity can be quite profitable, and when these industries pay taxes,
local officials have much to gain in turning a blind eye. See Connie Ling,
Everybody Does It: Protests and Crackdowns Haven't Diminished Asian
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intellectual property, the future state of enforcement is promising as
Chinese courts have, in some cases, prioritized applying international
treaties.1 96 While this suggests greater protection for franchisers, it
does not promise to solve the problem, as China is generally a civil
law system and judicial decisions are not normally precedent
setting.
97
3. Promising Signs for a Stronger Framework ofLaws and Legal
Enforcement
Despite problems with the rule of law, the government has enacted
several pieces of legislation that have, at least, set the framework for
reform in China. 98 Recent development and adoption of the
Administrative Litigation Law provides citizens with the ability to
sue government officials who violate laws. 99 The Administrative
Consumers' Appetite for Pirated VCDs, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at S3
(describing the pervasive nature of video compact disk piracy in Asia).
196. See IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 205
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002) (citing cases in which courts applied principles that
were stated in international treaties). In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
v. Beijing Art and Literature Publishing House Recording and Videotape Great
World, the First Intermediate People's Court of Beijing determined that
unauthorized film copies sold with the permission of the Ministry of Culture were
still illegal because China was a signatory to the Memorandum of Understanding
for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and was a member of the Berne
Convention for the Protection to Literary and Artistic Works. Id.
197. See Wang Guiguo, The Legal System of China, in CHINESE LAW, supra
note 75, at 1, 19 (stating that under the civil law system, the court has the power to
implement and not to actually interpret laws). This inability to actually interpret
laws has prevented case decisions from experienced judges to serve as guides for
lower court judges, and has prevented uniform application of the laws. See WANG,
supra note 56, at 45 (stating that the lack of stare decisis in the Chinese legal
system means that no system exists to ensure uniformity in legal interpretation and
application). But see Lin, supra note 62, at 225-26 (describing how in the city of
Zhengzhou, the District Court has developed a precedent system that allows
holdings to be established as precedent). In creating this system, Presiding Judge
Li Guanghu argued that this would help to minimize the problems with the civil
law system, while still following the currently existing laws. Id.
198. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
changes in Chinese laws that respond to problems with corruption and enforcement
of laws).
199. See Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, Apr.
4, 1989, art. 2 ("If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization considers that
his or its lawful rights and interests have been infringed upon by a specific
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Licensing Law similarly improves government accountability by
taking the right to grant franchises and licenses away from the
ministries and commissions and giving this power to industrial
associations and other intermediate agencies.2"0 This law limits the
restrictions on obtaining franchising rights.2°'
One promising sign of improvement in the judiciary is the "Judges
Law," which was passed to lessen the grip that the government has
on judges, and to make the judiciary more independent.20 2 Under this
law, administrative organs or other individuals cannot interfere with
the judiciary, and cannot remove judges unless there is a statutory
basis. 203 While this is a positive change in that it allows judges to act
outside the approval of the Party, the effect of this law is limited
administrative act of an administrative organ or its personnel, he or it shall have
the right to bring a suit before a people's court in accordance with this Law."),
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=5641 (last visited Feb. 15, 2004);
see also Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone? Administrative
Litigation in the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1, 7-8 (1989)
(describing how economic reforms and the increasing number of foreign investors
have created a larger base of people with financial interests in challenging
administrative body decisions). But see Officials Forced to Appear in Court,
CHINA DAILY, July 19, 2003 (noting that officials and heads of administrative
bodies who are sued rarely appear in court),
http://wwwl .chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-07/19/content_246390.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004). Only 0.1% of administrative directors ever appeared in court,
allowing lower officials to avoid legal scrutiny and accountability. Id.
200. See Lawmakers to Discuss Crucial Law, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 16, 2003
(detailing how there are many levels of administrative licensing that prevent a
more open market economy because this over-licensing creates inefficiency and
inequity in how licenses are granted), http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/en/
doc/2003-08/16/content_255391.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). Currently, there
are about 4, 100 items that require administrative licenses. Id.
201. See id. (stating that enterprises seeking licenses to start up businesses will
likely need to go to fewer government agencies for approval because, in 2001, the
government eliminated approximately 1,200 government licenses).
202. See China Adopts Amendments to Laws on Judges, Prosecutors, PEOPLE'S
DAILY, July 1, 2001 (quoting Li Peng, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee,
as stating that the revisions would help in "strengthening the caliber of the
country's judiciary and ensuring that justice be served"),
http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200107/01/eng20010701_73890.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2004).
203. See Judges Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 8 (1995) (stating
that judges cannot be removed, demoted or sanctioned unless statutory procedures
are followed), available at http://www.accci.com.au/judges-law.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004).
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because courts are expressly prohibited from determining the validity
of legislation.2" Also, the law is problematic in that it provides the
appearance of legitimacy, even though judges will likely continue to
act according to Party wishes because they generally are loyal
members of the Communist Party.20 5 Corruption in the past few years
has recently received greater attention.2 6 Investigations into the
corrupt practices of high level government officials have lent
credibility to China's evolution into a "rule of law" system.0 7
Ambiguity in the law translates into higher costs and less
efficiency because businesses must spend time and money to
determine the proper governing regulations. 208  Besides the
government's lack of efficiency, the disconnect between the central
government and local government can place businesses in the
difficult position of choosing which laws govern their particular
business practice.2 9 Similarly, the corruption that festers in this
disconnect forces businesses to choose between conforming with, or
204. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on the
implications of court decisions).
205. See LUBMAN, supra note 174, at 256 (determining that local party
organizations have final say over all judicial appointments).
206. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, at 29 (noting that the use of
bribery, at least in theory, has been condemned through the development of anti-
corruption laws).
207. See China Fires Official Amid Corruption Reports, THE ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Oct. 29, 2003 (stating that the Land and Resources Minister was fired and under
investigation), 2003 WL-WSJA 65016557. This investigation is the highest level
government official investigation since 2001, when a deputy chairman was
executed for accepting bribes. Id.
208. See Feinerman, supra note 77 (mentioning that the uneven application of
laws on a local level has left foreign investors confused).
209. See supra notes 184-199 and accompanying text (analyzing how the
plethora of vague laws can result in inconsistent local implementation, which puts
businesses in the difficult position of determining which laws they need to follow).
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refusing to succumb to, corruption. 210 This choice can ultimately
mean the choice between business success or failure in China.211
Another source of concern is a business' lack of awareness of
corrupt practices.212 When Chinese businesses introduce fees to
foreign businesses as standard costs, lack of awareness of regional
business practices will likely result in ignorance of what constitutes
reasonable fees.213 Similarly, even for those businesses that are well-
versed in business laws, the regulations and procedures can change
dramatically based on the region.214 Because national and regional
regulations undergo dramatic changes quite frequently, businesses
may not be aware of the changing standards for what constitutes
bribery and kickbacks. 215 Also, businesses may not be well-versed in
local business culture.21 6 While local businesses frown upon bribes,
gifts may or may not be acceptable.1 7 While foreign investors might
210. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, at 33 (listing results of a survey
about business practices in China). One respondent said that there was a difficult
quandary, because it was important to follow the ethical practices appropriate for
an international company, but failing to adopt the cultural practice of favor
granting would likely result in business failure in China. Id.
211. See id. (quoting a manager of a large multi-national corporation who said
that by not engaging in corruption, his company lost large amounts of business).
212. See generally Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of
China (1993) (failing to include good faith or lack of awareness as a defense to
charges of unfair business practices), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
213. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, 41 (noting that in Chinese
business, favors, or renqing, are important, but that there is a fine line between
these favors and illegal bribery).
214. See Carolita L. Oliveros, International Distribution Issues: Contract
Materials, 2003 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 675, 737 (warning
attorneys that Chinese government policies are "mercurial" and "subject to change
without notice").
215. See Yuan, supra note 131, at 483 (citing reasons why businesses may be
unaware of changing regulations and laws).
216. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 49 (stating that the foreign investor is often at
a disadvantage because of difficulties with obtaining information about
government structures and transaction procedures).
217. See id. (noting that in the past investors have accepted unfavorable
conditions and circumstances, which has led many Chinese business operators to
expect special treatment from foreign investors).
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have the best of intentions, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law does
not make allowances for those who unintentionally break the law.218
The potential for fully developing a "rule of law" system in China
is promising.219 The government has taken affirmative steps to
address the above problems.22° One key example of this occurred
when the Chinese government noted that much of the corruption was
rooted in licensing laws and responded by passing the Administrative
Licensing Law.2 1 Despite the progress towards uniformity and
transparency of laws, there are several problems in the laws
themselves that can still impede franchising.222
C. NAVIGATING THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE LAWS
1. Trademark Protection Falls Short
Vigilant intellectual property protection is vital to the operation
and longevity of a franchise. 223 Trademarks are private property and
218. See generally Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of
China (1993) (failing to mention lack of intent to accept or give bribes as obviating
possibility of prosecution), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
219. See Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
43, 106 (2001) (discussing the progress towards rule of law through more reliable
laws that help to create stronger stability in a market economy).
220. See id. (arguing that while laws have developed to provide foreign
corporations with more security in the development of businesses, the Chinese
Communist Party has maintained a strong resistance to political reform).
221. See Majority of Corruption Cases in China Linked to Licensing: Official,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, Aug. 30, 2003 (quoting Wang Yongquing as stating that the
administrative licensing law would help to combat the corruption arising from the
lack of restrictions and transparency in operations),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200308/30/eng20030830_123408.shtml (last
visited Feb. 13, 2004).
222. See S.R. Nair, Franchising Opportunities in China from the Perspective of
a Franchisee, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra
note 28, at 109, 116 (arguing that new franchise regulations, and the disconnect
between the regulations themselves and the implementation of the regulations, is a
significant challenge to investors seeking to franchise in China).
223. See William A. Finkelstein, Protecting Trademarks and Related
Intellectual Property Rights, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING,
supra note 26, at 59, 61 (arguing that franchising concepts consist of marks,
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are in and of themselves "commoditized products. 224 Any misuse of
a franchise's trademark can result in the depreciation of the quality
of goods or services associated with the franchise, not just within
China, but for the franchise chain internationally. 225 While China has
revised its trademark regulations to conform to the Trade Related
Intellectual Property Protection Agreement ("TRIPS") and WTO
provisions, the Chinese trademark regulations at this point do not
provide the same level of enforced protection that franchisors enjoy
in the United States or Europe. 26
Despite the fact that the legislative framework is in place to
provide trademark protection, Chinese trademark law has fallen short
for a few reasons. 227 First, courts often do not protect trademark
owners when different product or service lines copy the
trademarks. 28 Many small businesses seek to take advantage of the
positive image associated with well-known corporations.229 Under
the current law, where these businesses use a registered trademark
for a product or service line that is different from the original
symbols, trade dress, and particular ways of doing business). These elements are
often the basis for the inherent value of the franchise. Id.
224. See FENG, supra note 71, at 243 (stating that the value of a commodity lies
in the selling power of the product).
225. See Han, supra note 32, at 88 (describing how intellectual property
protection is probably the most important property that a franchisor owns).
226. See Trademark Law Amended to Better Protect Famous Brands, supra note
82 (describing the protections created by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress with the passage of the amended Trademark Law on October
27, 2001). While previously only words received protection, the new regulations
protect visual marks, including symbols and color combinations. Id.
227. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Trademark
Law, art. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Trademark Law] (stating that the intent of the
trademark law is to protect consumer expectations and to encourage producers to
guarantee the quality of their goods),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200310/20030100063803_1.xml (last visited
Feb. 12, 2003).
228. See CHAOWU JIN & WEI Luo, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 127 (Chinese
Law Series Vol. 6, 2002) (arguing that the goodwill associated with the names and
trademarks of large, well-known companies will likely extend to businesses in a
completely different line of business).
229. See id. (stating that businesses can unfairly benefit when they attach the
name of another company to their own product).
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trademark's intention, the business has not committed trademark
infringement.230
Second, the trademark law fails to make trademark dilution
illegal.231 This could pose a serious problem for franchises, because
trademark identity constitutes a large part of franchises.232 The
trademark law fails to enumerate dilution as a type of
infringement. 233 The threat of dilution is strong, as businesses often
realize the potential benefits of manipulating the public perception
associated with a business' goodwill.234 When laws and courts fail to
prevent this dilution, a franchise can suffer substantial harm to its
credibility.235 Where consumers are unable to associate products with
a particular franchise, consumers cannot associate the goodwill and
good quality, which is the primary benefit of owning a franchise.236
230. See id. at 126 (defining the concept of "conceptual connection," whereby
companies can capitalize on the goodwill associated with trademark or business
name in another industry).
231. See id. at 123 (noting the trademark law's failure to provide business
operators protection from trademark dilution).
232. See KAUFMANN, supra note 23, at 14 (citing the trademark as an element of
the franchise that helps to convey authenticity and exclusivity).
233. See generally Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China:
Trademark Law, art. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Trademark Law] (failing to provide
recourse for trademark dilution cases),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200310/20030100063803_1.xml (last visited
Feb. 12, 2003); see also JIN & Luo, supra note 228, at 123 (defining dilution as
when the business associated with a strong mark is unable to distinguish clearly
their goods from competitor's goods).
234. See JIN & Luo, supra note 228, at 126 (noting that this may constitute an
unfair business practice).
235. See Han, supra note 32, at 88 (discussing the importance of protecting
intellectual property in a franchise). In one case in the Sichuan Province, a brewery
had properly registered its mark only to find that another brewery in the Guizhou
Province was using a name, design, and even coloration of mark that was similar to
the Sichuan Brewery's registered mark; see also JIN & Luo, supra note 228, at 124
(describing the extent of the similarities between the two products). For four years,
the Sichuan brewery attempted to stop the Guizhou brewery's production and
unauthorized usage of the registered trademark before it finally brought suit in
court. Id. The duration of the trademark disputes created widespread consumer
confusion, to the extent that consumers contacted their local AIC offices for
clarification. Id.
236. See DELI YANG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA
61 (Pervez N. Ghauri, series ed., 2003) (describing the importance of "intellectual
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Also, if products or services use trademarks illegally, and the
products or services are deficient, this negative stigma can attach to
the trademark itself.2 3
7
Third, penalties issued are often not severe enough to deter future
trademark infringers.238  Penalties imposed by the SAIC's
administrative action in the past have often failed to provide
adequate relief, and as a result, have not served as a strong deterrent
for criminals or corporations seeking to turn a profit.2 39 For example,
when a Chinese enterprise infringed the Disney trademark by using
the Mickey Mouse character, the SAIC fined the company ninety-
one dollars.240 When the government-affiliated Shenzhen University
Research Institute counterfeited the Microsoft trademark and sold
illegal copies of programs, the SAIC fined the infringers $260.241
While the laws themselves now impose harsher penalties, the
enforcement of the laws and the ensuing penalties has proven
problematic.242 Despite the problems with enforcement, a recent
landmark court decision has "give[n] teeth to its claims of rule of
capital," which is the sum of the company's technology, management processes,
and overall knowledge that translates into profits).
237. See id. at 64 (urging companies to not make the common mistake of
underestimating the value of intellectual property as a company's intangible asset).
238. See Lisa Movius, Imitation Nation, SALON.COM, Jul. 8, 2003 (quoting the
Chinese proverb, "if everyone does wrong, no one will be punished," to describe
the lack of intellectual property rights enforcement), at
http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/08/imitationnation/indexl.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
239. See id. (noting that with the demise of the state owned enterprises,
unemployed individuals are more willing to engage in selling illegal trademark
infringing products, even if the punishment entails fines).
240. See Linus Chua, China Steps up Enforcement of Piracy Laws, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1994, at D3 (observing that the case award would have been much higher
in the United States).
241. See Ruth Youngblood, China Fights Trademark Abuse, UPI, Apr. 12, 1994
(noting the lax punishment given for illegal trademark use); see also Harriet King,
Microsoft Nails Some Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, § 3, at 7 (estimating that
the software industry alone loses fourteen billion dollars a year to piracy).
242. See King, supra note 241 (discussing the difficulty that companies face in
attempting to enforce piracy laws in China).
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law. 2 43 Educational Testing Services, a U.S.-based company that
owns the TOEFL, GRE, and GMAT tests and trademarks, accused
New Oriental Education Group, a Chinese private language training
institute of copyright and trademark infringement and sought $3.63
million in compensation.2" The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate court
ordered the New Oriental Education Group to hand over all illegal
test copies, to publish an apology, and to pay $1.21 million dollars in
compensation.245 While this payment was unprecedented, experts
estimate that this fine was much less than what New Oriental earned
from the infringement. 46 It remains to be seen whether this case is
indicative of stricter intellectual property controls, or whether it is
merely an anomaly.247
Finally, the anti-unfair competition law does not provide solid
protection for all franchise trade secrets.248 While the law exists, it
does not provide mechanisms for enforcement. 249 Even if there were
sufficient enforcement mechanisms, business information that does
243. See Copyright Infringement Fine Sparks Debate, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 2,
2003 (describing the events of the Educational Testing Service case),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Oct/76561.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
244. See Court Rules against English Language School in Copyright Lawsuit,
CHINA COURT, Sept. 28, 2003 (discussing the details of the case),
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3350 (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
245. See id. (noting the punishment imposed in this case).
246. See Copyright Infringement Fine Sparks Debate, supra note 243 (arguing
that that this fine was not high at all because the company earned much more from
the infringement than it was ordered to pay).
247. See Chinese Firm to Appeal Verdict in Copyright Case Won by U.S.
Education Groups, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 29, 2003 (stating that the
court's award was unusual because foreign entities rarely win copyright
infringement cases and when they do, they are only awarded nominal
compensation), 2003 WL 71371165.
248. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, art.
10 (1993) (protecting business operators by prohibiting third parties from
"obtaining, using or disclosing" secrets that the party knows or should know
constitutes an illegal act), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
249. See Kang Rui & Feng Xiaoju, A Challenge to Emerging Economies: New
Competition Patterns Required in the Telecommunications Industry - The Case of
China After Its Entry into the WTO, 36 INT'L LAW. 1173, 1179 (2002) (stating that
enforcement is assigned to authorities above the country level, but that there are no
entities that "monitor, interpret or enforce the provisions of the law).
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not fall inside the definition of a trade secret may not obtain
protection.25 0 Accordingly, trade secret information should further be
protected through contractual agreement with all those who come
into contact with information associated with the franchise's business
structure, methods of operation, and any secrets involved in products
and services."' The Contract Law also proves helpful in the
protection of trade secrets because it mandates that when another
party learns trade secrets in the course of developing a contract, even
if the contract does not ultimately come to fruition, the party learning
the secret is to keep the information secret. 2  This law helps to
protect franchisors who have divulged information to a franchisee
expected to sign a contract, but the contract then fails to form or
becomes void.253 Besides creating these additional layers of
protection, contracts can also help to satisfy the requirement that the
trade secret owner take affirmative steps to prevent the public from
knowing about the secret.254
D. EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTS IN CIRCUMVENTING PROBLEMS
IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE LAWS THEMSELVES
The developments in contract law signal the Chinese
government's willingness to develop greater freedom in
250. See JIN & Luo, supra note 228, at 132 (questioning the vagaries involved in
determining whether business information constitutes a trade secret).
251. See Finkelstein, supra note 223, at 93 (recommending that franchisors
create contractual remedies for trade secret breaches because trade secrets are
extremely difficult to protect).
252. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 43 (2003) (stating that when other parties disclose trade secrets that they
have learned in the course of formulating a contract, they shall be liable for the
losses that result from the disclosure),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200301/20030100064766-1.xml (last visited
Feb. 11, 2004).
253. See Peter J. Klarfeld, Introduction, in COVENANTS AGAINST COMPETITION
IN FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS xi (Peter J. Klarfeld ed., 1992) (noting that one of the
most significant characteristics of a franchise is the transfer of confidential
business information that could make the other person a more effective
competitor).
254. See JIN & Luo, supra note 228, at 137 (translating a SAIC provision stating
that confidentiality agreements and rules can help a trade secret holder to show that
steps were taken to keep the information confidential).
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contracting.255 The Uniform Contract Law states, that parties "enjoy
the legal right to voluntarily conclude contracts, and no work unit or
individual may illegally intervene" in the contractual relationship.
25 6
Permitting Chinese individuals and foreign persons to be able to
contract together is a significant step in developing a market-driven
economy. 7 Relaxation of regulations over who can contract and the
regulations governing contracts should improve the economy by
allowing more contractual relationships to develop.258
Well-drafted contracts can provide a significant layer of protection
for franchises against China's weak legal structure.259 To create
strong contracts, foreign investors must anticipate and draft
protections against even those scenarios that seem unlikely. 260 Weak
drafting can be the basis for substantial financial and legal
burdens.261
255. See Chen, supra note 100, at 154 (stating that China has changed its legal
system and adopted Western legal concepts to meet the WTO requirements).
256. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 60 (discussing the scope of legal rights that contracting parties have,
including mutual duties of "notification, assistance, and confidentiality").
257. See Chen, supra note 100, at 170 (discussing how the limitations on who
could form contracts was a violation of the Chinese constitution).
258. See Hitchingham, supra note 100, at 3-4 (determining that the relaxation of
regulations will be beneficial to the economy because under the Uniform Contract
Law, contracts can still be valid even if there are missing or disputed terms).
259. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Contract
Law, art. 12 (recommending that contracts include names of parties and residence,
subject matter of contract, quantity, quality, price, time limit, place and method of
contract performance, liabilities involved for breach of contract, and methods of
dispute settlement).
260. See GAMBLE, supra note 46, at 15-16 (stating that while the purpose of a
contract law is to help prevent opportunistic behavior, two specific problems with
the law limit the effectiveness of the law in protecting parties). Gamble argues that
the contract law itself is too ambiguous and the fact that the law allows for state
supervision can be problematic where foreign investors are involved in business
dealings with state run enterprises. Id. at 16.
261. See id. at 5-6 (discussing an example of General Motors' ("GM") problems
when its contract failed to protect it from joint venture problems). In 2000, GM re-
entered the Chinese market after an unsuccessful first attempt through a joint
venture with FAW Jinbei Automotive in an equal partnership. Id. Problems arose
when the parent company of FAW transferred forty-six percent of ownership
shares to the local Shenyan government and this local government in turn sold
shares in the joint venture to China Brilliance. Id. While GM started off with one
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Another key component of effective drafting is overcoming the
language barrier. 62 Translations often do not fully capture the
minutiae involved in languages. 263 Foreign enterprises must be
prepared to hire counsel to draft a contract in English, but also to hire
counsel well-versed in Chinese contract law to draft a Chinese
version." Particularly for those contracts involving protection of
intellectual property and trade secrets, there must be well-drafted
Chinese contracts.265 While translations are important to provide
understanding for other parties involved in the contract, they are
absolutely critical to provide clear direction to the courts in the event
that dispute resolution becomes necessary.266
partner, it ended up with three partners, with the original company FAW holding
28.59%, the Shenyang government with 4.6%, and Brilliance with 33.12%. Id.
However, because China's contract law mandates that parties must still perform
their duties even when there is a change in the legal representatives or persons in
charge, GM was forced to honor the original agreement. Id.; see also GM Faces
Challenging Road Ahead with New China JV, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 19,
2000 (mentioning a previous failed JV in Shenyang and the re-entrance into the
market). Because FAW was a subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise, the joint
venture was ultimately a relationship with the Chinese government, which the
company believed was favorable for relationship building. Id.; see also David
Blumenthal, "Reform" or "Opening"? Reform of China's State-Owned
Enterprises and WTO Accession-the Dilemma of Applying GATT to Marketizing
Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 201 (1998) (noting that state-owned
enterprises have enjoyed preferential treatment).
262. See R. Randle Edwards, Legal Training for China Ventures, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1985 295, 298 (Com. L. & Prac., Course
Handbook Series No. 349, 1985) (suggesting that joint legal training efforts
between the United States and China are the best way to ensure that the
negotiations and contract developments reflect a meeting of the minds).
263. See id. at 297 (stating that there is always a substantial risk for
misunderstanding due to legal and cultural differences, and that companies should
retain local foreign counsel to reduce that risk).
264. See Jonathan Reuvid, Identification and Selection of Partners, in DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 213, 223 (Jonathan Reuvid & Li Yong eds., 2d ed. 1998)
(noting that documents submitted to the approval authorities must be written in
Chinese, but that documents can be drafted simultaneously in a language to which
the parties agree).
265. See supra text accompanying note 258-261 (examining the reasons that
contractual agreements to protect trade secrets are important).
266. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131,214 (2000)
(stating that many Chinese judges lack experience, expertise, and formal
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While investment of capital in a joint venture is a form of
ownership one cannot transfer freely and only through approval by
government authorities, when foreign investors contract with
government authorities in a JV, the conditions of a business
enterprise can change dramatically.2 67 Failing to consider this
scenario in any partnership based contractual agreement can set the
stage for a confusing business relationship that is detrimental to a
company's long-term business strategy.268 Specifically, franchisors
should be wary of the glaring problem with the Uniform Contract
Law which gives Chinese government officials the right to supervise
contracts. 269 Reservation of power over contracts allows China to
influence the outcome of contracts in which it has an interest. 270 This
may prevent the non-governmental party in a contract from being
able to resolve a dispute in a neutral forum. 271
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RESEARCH LOCAL CULTURAL AND BUSINESS PRACTICES, AND
ADJUST THE FRANCHISE ACCORDING TO REGIONAL PREFERENCES
Franchise success in China has often hinged upon adapting
business models to suit Chinese consumers and establishing
education, which can hinder their ability to interpret the many laws and regulations
that might govern).
267. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 54 (explaining that the laws and regulations
involve a variety of government entities that range from the State Development
Planning Commission at the central government level, which examines and
approves project proposals and feasibility studies, to local provincial or municipal
planning authorities). A JV entity only exists once all the proper governmental
approvals and licenses have been obtained. Id. at 55.
268. See Hitchingham, supra note 100, at 14-16 (discussing some of the possible
problems that arise when a change of partner scenario is not considered in the
contract).
269. See id. at 23-24 (stating that the state can create contractual procedures that
are beneficial to government agencies, and that under the Uniform Contract Law,
they have the discretion to interpret and replace terms in a contract).
270. See id. (discussing the implications of the government reservation of power
in the Contract Law).
271. See id. at 24 (stating that the wide discretion held by courts, and the power
of administrative review can prevent parties from having their disputes fairly
resolved).
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successful stores to attract qualified franchisees.2 2 While there has
been much analysis about the concept of guanxi, personal
relationship building in China is as important as relationship building
in other countries. Similarly, businesses that fail to consider the
regional differences that distinguish the provinces of China are also
likely to fail.27 4
From the management perspective, businesses should carefully
research regional businesses practices.7 5 Lack of awareness of local
norms and customs can alienate employees, potential franchisees,
and government officials.7 6 Franchises that take the time to develop
their businesses with their target clients and employees in mind will
have a stronger chance of business success in China. 77
272. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text (positing that the shortage
of management puts franchisors in the position of having to compete for qualified
franchisee applicants); see also English & Xau, supra note 28, at 46-47 (noting the
success of franchisors who modify products for their target markets).
273. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 48 (suggesting that the importance of guanxi
in China has been exaggerated).
274. See supra notes 166-199 and accompanying text (suggesting reasons for the
differences in law, and the disparity in enforcement between the regions of China).
275. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 48 (advising foreign investors to find
knowledgeable local assistants or spend time thoroughly researching the proposed
transaction, the business matter, the background of possible partners, and the
applicable political and legal systems).
276. See Gordon Chen, Relationships Build Success in China, AUSTL. FIN. REV.
53 (Aug. 15, 2003) (advising companies to take time to learn about China's
"cultural nuances"), 2003 WL 61012419. Some of the differences Chen highlights
include: where people say "yes" in China, they do not necessarily mean to agree,
but simply to demonstrate that they have heard the words; that there is a different
conception of payment, as payment for goods can extend over months; and that the
Chinese place a great emphasis on an individual's "good name". Id.
277. See English & Xau, supra note 28, at 50 (describing how McDonald's has
worked hard to adapt its "food culture" to China and has become one of the most
prestigious places to work).
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B. FRANCHISING DIRECTLY, PRIOR TO TESTING THE VIABILITY OF
THE FRANCHISE IN CHINA, COULD PROVE DETRIMENTAL TO THE
FRANCHISE INTERNATIONALLY
Businesses unwilling to modify their products and services to suit
the palates of Chinese consumers -are unlikely to be successful.278
Opening up company-owned stores to conduct research provides the
best means of figuring out which products appeal the most to the
211region. 7 Initially, rapid area development for franchising can lead to
problems with protecting intellectual property.2 ° Coupled with the
lack of qualified management applicants for franchising structures,
area development can lead to poor management and an overall
depreciation of franchise quality.28 ' Opening up a successful
company-owned store will allow businesses to test the market for the
product or service, and experiment with developing successful
management structures.282
278. See id. at 47 (noting that McDonald's has successfully adapted its menu to
suit local tastes in sixty-six countries); see also Ramoncito dela Cruz, Taco Bell
Goes to China, But No Fast-Food Style, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Apr. 15, 2003
(stating that one of the reasons that KFC has been so successful is that it
incorporates local food tastes, like a Peking Duck burrito):
279. See English & Xau, supra note 28, at 47 (describing how McDonald's, in
realizing that there was a shortage of management talent, opened a "Hamburger
University" to train employees).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97, 155 (noting that when trade
secrets are divulged in a JV, the franchisor loses the ability to fully prevent the
"secret" and management structures from being used in competitive businesses).
281. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Reorganization and Conversion of a Joint Venture
into a Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise in the People's Republic of China, 73
TUL. L. REv. 619, 627 (1998) (stating that the old inefficient state-driven economy
has prevented individuals with managerial experience from developing the
technological, financial, and management skills that are necessary to compete in
the new economy).
282. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text (describing the positive
experience of international franchisors who opened up company-owned stores in
China prior to franchising).
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C. WHEN FINANCIAL RESOURCES ARE ADEQUATE, FRANCHISORS
SHOULD SEEK TO MAKE THEIR FIRST STORE AND THE FRANCHISE
CHAIN A WFOE BECAUSE OF STRONGER LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Franchisors with available resources should open their first stores
and the ensuing franchise system in China as a WFOE.2 83 China has
made it more difficult to gain permission for WFOEs than for JVs
because the government cannot supervise WFOE operations. 84
While the approval process is difficult, the benefits far outweigh the
time and costs of obtaining approval, and thus it is not uncommon
for China to grant approval.285
During initial forays into the Chinese market, foreign investors
traditionally relied upon the joint venture model because there was a
belief that a Chinese partner would be well-connected and have the
requisite guanxi for business success.28 6 With a well-connected
Chinese partner, the foreign investor hoped to avoid navigating an
undeveloped legal system and political channels.2187 However,
because the government now places an emphasis on developing a
"rule of law," the role that personal relationships play in business
development in terms of obtaining the necessary permits and licenses
will likely lessen.288 Similarly, greater transparency in the laws, as
283. See supra text accompanying note 133 (discussing the advantages
associated with the WFOE, particularly the ability to maintain tight control over
intellectual property).
284. See WANG, supra note 56, at 132 (stating that foreign investors must
receive preliminary approval from the local government, and then receive formal
approval from Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation). After
approval, the foreign enterprise must register and obtain a business license. Id. at
134.
285. See id. at 131 (citing a Xinhu News Agency statistic that in 1997, forty-five
percent of the newly approved foreign investment companies were WFOEs).
286. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 476 (stating that businessmen in China
used to believe that success was contingent upon a well-connected Chinese
business partner).
287. See id. (detailing how foreign investors relied heavily upon their Chinese
partners to have social and political clout).
288. See id. at 476-77 (determining that one of the reasons that corporations
have been so vocal in calling for rule of law is because it provides security for
business owners who are concerned about how to structure their businesses).
Without transparency of laws, there is much room for corruption and inconsistent
administration of rules. Id.
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required by WTO accession, can provide a clearer understanding of
procedures that foreign franchisors need to follow when establishing
their first stores.289 Strong evidence exists to demonstrate both the
government's commitment to developing a rule of law and growing
support from the general population for this rule of law.29°
D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS ONE OF
A FRANCHISE'S MOST VALUED ASSETS, AND STEPS MUST BE
TAKEN TO ENSURE PROTECTION
Wholly owned enterprises have a distinct advantage because they
allow franchisors to have more control over the trademark identity of
the franchise.2 91 Full ownership of the enterprise allows the franchise
to shape and develop the trademark, the advertising, and the products
associated with the mark.192 Franchisors may also circumvent the
problem in the trademark laws that only protect the mark in the
289. See Peter H. Koehn, The Shanghai Outlook on the WTO: Local
Bureaucrats and Accession-Related Reforms, 75 PAC. AFF. 399, 408-09 (2002)
(quoting the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi
Guangsheng as stating that China will "reinforce its legal system and establish a
more unified, standardized and transparent system of foreign trade and economic
relations" that will "protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign
investors"), available at 2002 WL 24263690.
290. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 481-82 (drawing parallels between
foreign investment and farming in determining that social connections are not an
adequate substitute for the rule of law). While the rural farmers used to rely upon
personal relationships at the expense of defined property rights, the resulting illegal
taxes and misappropriation of village funds created problems. Id. at 483. Villager
appeals to higher party officials have proved unsuccessful, and villagers have
increasingly turned to the legal system for redress. Id. at 483-84.
291. See supra text accompanying note 133 (noting the benefits that the WFOE
has in intellectual property protection).
292. See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China: Trademark
Law, art. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Trademark Law] (conferring upon trademark
registrants the exclusive right to use the mark in the line of goods for which the
mark is registered),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200310/20030100063803_.xml (last visited
Feb. 12, 2003).
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product line for which it is registered by attempting to register the
mark for several different types of goods and services. 293
With long-term growth in mind, franchisors can similarly set the
framework for the future by maintaining direct control over the
content of contractual agreements. 94 In considering the substantial
costs of maintaining joint venture relationships, the decreasing need
to rely upon these relationships to enforce the law, and the
importance of maintaining strict control over the quality of the
franchise itself, the cost-benefit calculation clearly favors the wholly
owned foreign enterprise.295
E. DEVOTE RESOURCES TO OVERCOME LANGUAGE BARRIERS
Bad translations can subject a franchise to legal liability and
depreciate the value of the franchise image. 296 As such, it is critical
that franchisors take into consideration all the possible meanings of a
word. 297 Because the English and Chinese languages are so different,
businesses may want to consider a Chinese name to provide
consumers with a name that they can easily pronounce. 98 When
registering for trademark protection, businesses should register both
their Chinese and English names, along with any graphical
293. See Finkelstein, supra note 223, at 75-76 (noting that while this often
involves greater costs and higher legal fees, the protections afforded to the
trademark by registering in several categories is worth the cost).
294. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 187 (implying that contractual agreements are
helpful because reliance upon trademark laws alone may not be effective since
more enforcement resources are devoted to prosecuting counterfeiting than
trademark infringement).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 130-143 (weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of WFOEs and JVs and concluding that the WFOE is a better
business vehicle for protecting intellectual property).
296. See Finkelstein, supra note 223, at 70 (citing a classic example of linguistic
misunderstanding: after the Chevrolet Nova automobile was introduced in Latin
American countries, the company discovered that Nova was interpreted as "no va,"
meaning "does not go" in Spanish).
297. See id. (discussing the Purdue slogan "[i]t takes a strong man to make a
tender chicken," which was translated into Spanish as "[i]t takes an aroused man to
make chicken affectionate").
298. See English & Xau, supra note 28, at 47 (describing how McDonald's
changed the pronunciation of its name to "Maidanglao" because it was easier to
pronounce for Chinese consumers).
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representations of their logo in either language.299 Often, English
products can acquire a "street name" which, if proven unfavorable,
can only work to devalue the product and the franchise as a whole. 00
Language considerations are also critical in contractual
agreements.301 Particularly because China's Contract Law borrows so
many terms from Western laws which have no history of
interpretation in China, clear definitions are critical to establish
duties and responsibilities in a contract.30 2
F. ACTING UNETHICALLY, EVEN IF THE BEHAVIOR IS
TECHNICALLY LEGAL, MAY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SHORT TERM
SOLUTIONS, BUT WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE ENTIRE
FRANCHISE TN THE LONG TERM
At this point, corruption is so widespread that enterprises may
have no recourse against corrupt government officials.3 3 While
299. See Kaplan, supra note 130, at 31 (advising businesses to obtain
professional counsel when registering their trademarks to ensure that all
translations are accurate and have no unintended meanings).
300. See David A. Victor, Cross-Cultural Awareness, in THE ABA GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESs NEGOTIATIONS: A COMPARISON OF CROSS-CULTURAL
ISSUES AND SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES 15, 16 (James R. Silkenat & Jeffrey M.
Aresty eds., 1994) (noting how translations are inexact, and that phrases often have
connotations which cannot be understood through literal translations).
301. See supra notes 264-268 and accompanying text (stressing the importance
of using clearly worded, well-drafted contracts in order to provide courts with clear
direction in arbitration or litigation).
302. See supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text (discussing how the
terminology which serves as the basis for some of China's newer laws does not
have a history of interpretation and widens the latitude that judges and arbiters
have in interpreting these terms).
303. See Evelyn Iritani, I Need Help; When a Group of Stanford Business
School Grads Got an E-mail from an Alum Imprisoned in Shanghai, They Sprang
into Action, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at Al (detailing how a Chinese graduate
of the Stanford Business School was arrested by Shanghai officials after refusing
to pay tax auditors 500,000 yuan, or $60,000, to stop a "special tax audit" of his
newly formed medical equipment business), 2003 WL 2433716. While Jude Shao
continued to meet with tax officials, he continued to refuse to pay off the tax
officials. Id. After he was arrested in April 1998, his family was told by someone
claiming to represent the Shanghai police that they would release him if the family
paid 300,000 yuan or about $36,000. Id. The family refused and he was arrested
and convicted in Shanghai No. 1 People's Intermediate Court for not paying taxes
and creating false invoices. Id. Contrary to Chinese judicial law, Shao was not able
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WFOEs offer more control over the franchise and are better in the
long run, JVs do provide for the possibility that the local partner will
be more familiar with local government corruption and can navigate
it accordingly.3°4 While it may be tempting for businesses to
circumvent the corruption by acquiescing to the officials' demands
for kickbacks, this route is not advisable, as it is illegal and can only
harm public perception of the enterprise. °5 Even if a course of action
seems unethical, rather than illegal, foreign investors should avoid
this behavior.30 6 Besides having ramifications for the franchise
internationally, there is the possibility that the broadly worded "good
faith" provisions in Chinese law can be applied.30 7
CONCLUSION
Large franchisors with adequate financial resources would be
hard-pressed to find adequate justification for failing to enter the
Chinese market.308 While the legal barriers are substantial, waiting to
to see a lawyer until shortly before trial. Id.; see also Karby Leggett, Expert Legal
Reviews Gain Prominence in China's Courts, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2003
(reporting that Jude Shao, a naturalized U.S. citizen, is still imprisoned, even
though a panel of six prominent Chinese legal scholars, including a former official
of China's Supreme People's Court, determined that his conviction was "absent of
sufficient evidence"), http://www.freejudeshao.com/articles/article-
WSJ_052903.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
304. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (citing some of the
advantages of having an enterprise with a Chinese partner).
305. See Localization Trap - Multinationals Hit by Corruption Scandals, CHINA
ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2002 (describing the scandals Unilever faced when counterfeit
products almost identical to its own were produced in the market, suggesting that
there was internal collaboration with the trademark infringers), 2002 WL
10273519. The company believes that the scandal will prove detrimental to the
product's image. Id.
306. See Hutchings & Murray, supra note 175, 43 (quoting interviewees of
multi-national corporations who place a strong emphasis on acting ethically to
preserve the international image, even if it means short-term financial losses in
China).
307. See supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text (discussing vague
provisions in Chinese law, which provide administrators with broad powers of
interpretation).
308. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (describing the favorable
conditions, and the receptive consumers that foreign investors have found when
entering the Chinese market).
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enter the Chinese market will allow competitors who entered the
market earlier to gain a strong competitive advantage. 09
Establishment of a successful franchise entails development of
"goodwill" behind the brand.310 Even when franchises are well
known internationally, to achieve success in China it is invaluable to
develop a loyal consumer base and attract potential franchisees.311
Franchisors should prepare themselves to enter the Chinese market
by developing a strong understanding of the cultural norms and
business practices of the regions in which they wish to do business.312
This type of understanding can only be gained through the practical
experience that comes with developing an initial company-owned
store.31 3 After establishing a franchise, it is critical that franchisors
place a premium on protecting the trademark and trade secrets of the
franchise through strict contracts with employees and joint owners.314
While the Chinese laws and legal structure are only beginning to
reflect the "rule of law," corporations that draft effective contractual
agreements and vigilantly police intellectual property will establish a
strong start in long term franchise development.3"5 As an old Chinese
309. See Richard McGregor, KFC Leads China 's New Appetite for Fast Food,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003 (describing the success of KFC, the first foreign fast
food franchise to open in China), available at 2003 WL 3916874. By the end of
this year, KFC will have double the number of stores of its biggest rival in China,
McDonald's. Id.
310. See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text (providing reasons why
trademark protection is important to a franchise).
311. See Phelim Kyne, McDonald's China Aims to Fix Marketing Errors, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003 (discussing McDonald's focus on branding as a
way to expand consumer loyalty to McDonald's stores).
312. See supra notes 274-279 and accompanying text (recommending that
foreign investors take the time to understand consumer tastes, and to better
understand regional business practices).
313. See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text (suggesting some of the
benefits that foreign investors have if they establish company owned stores prior to
franchising directly).
314. See supra notes 225-228 and accompanying text (explaining the serious
problems that can arise where international franchisors fail to protect their
intellectual property in China).
315. See supra notes 158-199 and accompanying text (describing the vagueness,
contradictions, and enforcement problems that have prevented a strong rule of
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proverb states, "Hao de kai shi shi cheng gong de yi ban," a good
start is halfway on the path to success. 16
law); see also supra text accompanying notes 257-273 (describing how contracts
can provide a layer of legal protection).
316. Interview with Carole Lee, Author's Mother, in East Hanover, N.J. (Nov.
23, 2003).
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